


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# **TACTICS B**

## **LECTURE NOTES FOR SENIOR STAFF COURSE QUALIFYING EXAMINATION**

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**NOTE**

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## **GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF THESE**

### **LECTURE NOTES**

1. This module provides general guidelines on the broad subject of Tac B (Internal Security and Peace Support Operations) for the Senior Staff Course Qualifying Examination (SSCQE). It covers topics in simplified formats to enable the student have a quick and clear grasp of scenarios in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). In the course of this review, new headings were added to the Counter-Revolutionary and Inter-Agency Co-operation Chapters to reflect current realities.
2. Questions were brought out at the end of each chapter which should be attempted by the student to build their confidence in preparation for the examination. Students are advised to attempt past examination questions to test level of readiness. While the module remains the main effort for the SSCQE assessment, students are advised to be conscious of the changing threat environment and seek update on tactical and operational procedures affected by policy reviews in the Nigerian Army.

## **CHAPTER 1**

# **GENERAL DEFINITIONS AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNAL SECURITY**

## **INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES**

1. Internal Security (IS) involves a wide range of activities that require response from government agencies and security forces. It arises at periods when law and order have been breached and the safety of lives and properties is threatened.
2. The objective of this chapter is to define commonly used terminologies in IS and to outline the authorities and agencies responsible for ensuring law and order.

## **DEFINITION OF TERMINOLOGIES**

3. **Civil Disobedience.** Civil disobedience is any active or passive resistance of the civil population to the authority or policies of a government, by such means as unlawful strikes, lock-outs, work to-rule etc.
4. **Civil Disturbance.** Civil disturbance is group acts of violence and disorder prejudicial to law and order usually necessitating police and possibly military intervention.
5. **Civil Authority.** Civil authority relates to the body entrusted with the rights and prerogatives of governing or determining the affairs of the citizens of a nation or part there of comprising the tripartite arrangement of the civil authority

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at the Federal, State and Local Government levels recognized by the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

6. **Insurrection.** The term insurrection refers to all forms of armed revolt directed against the civil authority. In its extreme form, insurrection relates to the forcible overthrow of the government whereas in the mild form, it seeks to embarrass and ridicule the civil authority. The target of insurrection is public order and public safety, and that explains why the Nigeria Police has the primary responsibility for internal security.

7. **State of Emergency.** A state of emergency is a situation in which the government acquires special powers in order to return a tense situation to normalcy. It may be as a result of political, social or economic upheaval or natural calamity. This bestows special powers to security agencies and denial of certain fundamental rights of the citizens.

8. **Rebellion.** Rebellion is a revolt or open expression of dissatisfaction by armed and organized groups.

9. **Guerilla Warfare.** Guerilla warfare are military or paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.

10. **Insurgent.** Insurgent relates to the term guerrilla, revolutionary, terrorist, dissident and rioter used on occasions to indicate differences in the opposition. When it has been necessary to indicate specific differences, insurgent has been used to cover all the roles implied by the foregoing terms. It has also been taken to include such additional terms as

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saboteur, enemy, insurrectionist or rebel when applicable.

11. **Terrorism.** Terrorism is a resort to violence by dissidents in order to intimidate and coerce people for political ends. This may manifest in sabotage and assassinations of individuals, ambushes or attacks on civilians or members of the security forces by individuals or large bodies of terrorists. It can take place in either urban or rural areas.

12. **Insurgency.** Insurgency is a form of rebellion in which a dissident group that has the support or acquiescence of a substantial part of the population, instigates the commission of widespread acts of civil disobedience, sabotage and terrorism, and wages guerrilla warfare in order to overthrow a government.

13. **Internal Security.** Internal Security is any military role which involves primarily the use of force necessary to maintain and restore law and order and essential services in the face of civil disturbances and disobedience.

14. **Internal Security Operations.** Internal security operations are activities, which are collectively undertaken by security agencies, towards the restoration of law and order in Nigeria.

15. **Counter Insurgency.** Counter Insurgency are those military, para-military, political, judicial, economic, psychological and sociological activities undertaken by a government, independently or with the assistance of friendly nations, to prevent or defeat insurgency and restore law and order.

16. **Counter Revolutionary Operations.** Counter



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Revolutionary Operations (CRO) is a generic term used to describe the operations which forces may have to undertake, when maintaining and restoring law and order in support of an established government, in order to counter the threats in an internal security or revolutionary war setting. These threats include civil disturbances, terrorism and organised insurgency-irrespective of whether these are nationalist, communist or racially inspired or directed from within or outside the threatened territory concerned.

17. **Military Aid to Civil Authority**. Military Aid to Civil Authority (MACA) are military activities and measures in response to domestic, natural, and man-made disasters; assistance in response to civil disturbances and in counter drug, sensitive support, Counter-Terrorism (CT) and law enforcement. It is conducted to fill civil authority capacity gaps.

18. **Military Aid to Civil Power**. Military Aid to Civil Power (MACP) is the provision of military assistance (armed if appropriate) to the civil power in its maintenance of law, order and public safety using specialist capabilities or equipment, in situations beyond the capability of the civil power.

19. **Military Assistance to the Civil Community**. Military Assistance to the Civil Community (MACC) is the provision of unarmed military assistance to the civil community when they have a need for help or in furtherance of NA CIMIC activities, including assistance to civil sponsors in special projects of significant social value to the community. It could also be the provision of unarmed military assistance to the country at large.

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20. **Flash Point.** The term flash point refers to an area prone to high tension. It is designated for the purpose of de-escalating crises or preventing its eruption. The designation of a high tension crisis area as a "Flash Point" relates to monitoring and enabling a quick reaction of security agencies for probable IS operations.

21. **Base Area.** The area, virtually free from guerrilla interference, that has a defensive perimeter, and from which offensive operations may be mounted and supported. It will normally be based on a port and/or, strategic transport terminal airfield.

22. **Controlled Area.** Controlled area is an area not entirely free from the dissidents in which condition permits the civil administration and police to work effectively in cooperation with military forces.

23. **Battalion/Company Base.** Temporary bases set up when establishing or expanding control areas. Such bases may be located alongside civil/police HQ, near defended villages, or in the countryside. Defence arrangements must allow for a large proportion of the force to be out of the base on offensive operations.

24. **Defended Villages.** Villages in controlled areas which have been organised for defence with a view to giving the inhabitants security from insurgent action, preventing subversive elements assisting the insurgents and encouraging the provision of information. Initially, defended villages may have to be manned by military forces but in the long term the aim must be to train and organise home guards so that they

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and the police are able to take over the static defence from military forces.

25. **Forward Operational Base.** Forward Operational Base (FOB) is an area providing a semi-permanent firm base from which offensive action against the insurgents can be developed. It should be established at a seat of local government as, a formation base, usually at brigade level, and will normally have a Tactical airfield capable of quick development.

26. **Operations in Depth.** Operations designed to locate, disrupt and destroy hard core insurgents outside controlled areas with a view to relieving a better chance of success. Operations in depth may be launched from temporary bases established in the area of operations, or they may take the form of "in and out" operations launched direct from a main or forward operation base.

27. **Pacification Operations.** Military operations designed to clear and hold an area of immediate insurgent influence and re-establish civil control. Military forces will continue to provide security until para-military and police forces can accept responsibility.

28. **Propaganda.** Any activity or plan for the spread of information, opinion and principles.

29. **Psychological Operations.** Psychological operation is the planned use of propaganda or other means in support of military action or presence designed to influence to our advantage the opinion, attitude and behaviour of enemy, neutral or friendly groups.

## **RESPONSIBILITY FOR IS OPERATIONS**

30. **President Commander-in-Chief.** The President, Commander-in-Chief is the Chief Executive and has constitutional responsibility for security throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The highlight of the Presidents' responsibilities in IS are as follows:

- a. Chairmanship of National Security Council.
- b. Designation of crisis high tension area as "Flash Point".
- c. Declaration of a state of emergency throughout the Federation or part thereof.
- d. Determination of timing, extent and scope of military commitment.
- e. Setting the Rules of Engagement.

31. **State Governors.** The Section 176(2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria confers on the Governors, the status of States' Chief Executives, and by inference, the following responsibilities during IS operations:

- a. Chairmanship of the State Security Committee.
- b. Request to the President for high tension crisis area within the state to be designated Flash Point on the advice of the State Security Committee.
- c. Request to the President for the declaration of a state of emergency in the state or part thereof on a motion by the State Security Committee.

32. **Chairmen and Local Government Councils.** Local Government Councils (LGC) are recognized in Section 7(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as the third tier of government. The Constitution however did not specifically allot security responsibilities to the Council or the

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Chairman, who is the Chief Executive. Nevertheless, an omnibus provision for the State House of Assembly to allot such "other functions as may be conferred on the LGC, and this could be explored to include security functions. The LGC monitors and evaluate crisis situation through a Local Government Security Committee composed as follows:

- a. Chairman of the Local Government.
- b. Secretary to the Local Government.
- c. Local Military Commander.
- d. Divisional Police Officer.
- e. Representative of SSS.
- f. Representatives of other para military organisations.
- g. Traditional Ruler, Chief, District Head of the troubled area (where necessary).

33. **The Nigeria Police Force.** The IGP is charged with the maintenance of public safety and public order; the vital ingredients in IS. The duties of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) range from the prevention and detection of crimes, apprehension of offenders, preservation of law and order, protection of law and order, enforcement of laws and regulations to the performance of limited military duties (when authorized). In IS operation, NPF is the first contact with the citizens and also the link with other security agencies and government. The NPF also provides initial intelligence and facilities for operation's command and control (Joint Operations Room). The NPF invites other security agencies like the military in IS operations if the following situation exist:

- a. The incident (crisis) is widespread, and/or
- b. The Police resources are inadequate.

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34. **The Armed Forces.** The Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) consist of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Section 217(2) confers on the AFN the responsibility to suppress insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President. The Armed Forces may be used for IS operations only under the following conditions:

- a. When the situation has gone out of control of the Police.
- b. When the civil authorities in the crisis area are convinced of the seriousness of the occurrence, and make a request for military intervention.
- c. When there are evidences that the situation could spread and threaten national security.
- d. When external support is suspected or could be encouraged by the prolongation of the crisis.

35. **Nigerian Army.** Although the Armed Forces Act 105 (as amended) 1999 assigned some civil duties to the NN and the NAF, the NA as the land force, is the arrowhead of major IS operations. In order to ensure command and control, coordination and dissemination of information and intelligence, NA continually monitors the crisis situation until it is called upon to take over from the Police. Specimen handing and taking over is at Annexes A and B. This command responsibility does not limit the NA from access to other sources of information or cooperation with other security agencies.

36. **Other Security Agencies.** There are other security agencies established by law or through administrative fiat that have important roles to perform during IS operations. These agencies are as follows:

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- a. **Office of the National Security Adviser.** The NSA is located at the Presidency. It is the office that coordinates all the intelligence organs in the country. It advises the President on the courses of action that are appropriate for specific crisis situation, its desirable level of force and its implication.
- b. **Department of State Services.** The DSS is the government organ specifically assigned with the responsibility of managing IS. Its duties include gathering of information and intelligence as well as giving advance warning of impending threat.
- c. **National Intelligence Agency.** This is the arm of the nation's intelligence system responsible for collating intelligence from foreign sources. It functions mostly outside the country but has some of its units deployed at major entry/exit points/ports. It is also charged with the monitoring of external involvement in internal crisis.
- d. **Nigeria Customs Service.** The Nigerian Custom Service (NCS) offices can be found all over the federation. It is organized into zonal commands with its main operations at the entry/exit points/ports of the country. Its major duty as it relates to IS is to prevent the importation of items (including arms) considered detrimental to good governance, public safety and public order.

e. **Nigeria Immigration Service.** The Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) has its offices across the country with the main functions at the entry/exit points/ports. Its major duty is to maintain checks on the pattern of emigration and immigration especially in the security analysis of external involvement in IS matters.

f. **Nigeria Correctional Service.** The Nigerian Correctional Service (NCS) maintains various categories of prisons across the country. Its statutory function is to hold miscreants and convicts in accordance with laid down laws and procedures. In order to accept the detention of persons arrested during IS crisis, NCS requires judicial authorization as contained at Annex C to be issued by a magistrate. It is important, therefore, for security forces to work hand in hand with magistrates when arrest and detention are imminent in a crisis situation.

g. **National Drug Law Enforcement Agency.** The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) has its units at entry/exit points/ports, as well as in all local government areas. Its main responsibility is to monitor information relating to sources of drug destination and consumption pattern, which are essential to unraveling drug induced crimes especially in IS crisis.



- h. **Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps.**  
The Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) has recently become involved in IS operations. They assist the police and also serve as a source of intelligence to the military. They also take part in the organization and administration of IDP camps during IS crisis.
- i. **Defence Intelligence Agency.**

## **CRISIS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE**

37. **National Security Council.** National Security Council (NSC) is empowered to advise the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on matters relating to any organization or agency established by law for ensuring the security of the federation. The identification of a crisis leads to the convening of a NSC meeting to assess the situation and take appropriate action. It is at this level that the crisis is weighed against national interest, national policies, aims and objectives which eventually lead to national directives. It is composed as follows:

- a. C-in-C.
- b. Vice President.
- c. HMOD.
- d. HMIA.
- e. CDS.
- f. HMFA.
- g. NSA.
- h. IGP.

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- i. Such other person as the President may in his discretion approve.

**National Defence Council.** The National Defence Council (NDC) is activated by the C-in-C when matters relating to the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria are involved. It is at the NDC that military options are perfected and put into effect, even though in accordance with the AFA, the NDC's responsibility shall not extend to the operational use of the Armed Forces. It should also be noted that a combined meeting of the NSC and NDC is referred to as the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC). The NDC is composed of the following members:

- j. The President – Chairman
- k. The Vice-President - Deputy Chairman.
- l. Minister of Defence.
- m. CDS.
- n. COAS.
- o. CNS
- p. CAS.
- q. DG SS.
- r. Such other members as the President may appoint.

38. **National Operations Committee.** The executive arm of the National Defence and Security Council is the National Operation Committee. Its task is to implement in the military sphere, the policies of the National Defence and Security Council. The chairman of the committee should be the Commander-in-Chief of the security forces. Other members include:

- a. Foreign Affairs Ministry' representative.
- b. Internal Affairs Ministry representative.

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- c. The Police representative.
- d. DSS representative.
- e. Any other member as directed by the C-in-C.

39. **The Director of Operations.** The Head of the Armed Forces or the head of police can be appointed the director of operations by the head of government. The anticipated security situation would influence the director's appointment. However, his appointment must be linked to overall command of the security forces, the composition and balance of these forces. The director of operations is usually chairman of the National Operations Committee unless this post is held by the President.

40. **Operations Committee.** At subordinate levels-state and local government areas, integrated coordination committees are established. They are referred to as operations committee. The Chairman of an operations' committee should preferably be the senior officer of the local military and police command or a representative of the intelligence and security organizations. Other local government civilian experts may be co-opted.

### **Annexes:**

- A. Specimen Form for Police Handover to the Military.
- B. Specimen Form for Military Hand over to the Police.
- C. Authority for Arrest /Detention.

### **SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS**

- 1. Define the following:
  - a. Internal Security.
  - b. Insurgency.
  - c. Sabotage.

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- d. Subversion.
  - e. Insurrection.
  - f. Rebellion.
  - g. Controlled Areas.
  - h. Terrorism.
  - i. Counter Intelligence.
  - j. Civil Disturbance.
  - k. Civil Authority.
  - l. Flashpoint.
2. Differentiate between subversion and insurrection.
  3. Differentiate between controlled areas and flash points.
  4. State and explain in detail the hierarchical order of IS responsibilities in Nigeria.
  5. State and explain 3 components of the crisis management structure in Nigeria.

## **CHAPTER 2**

# **PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS AND MILITARY AID TO CIVIL AUTHORITY**

## **INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES**

1. Internal Security entails the collective efforts of the military and other security agencies authorized by the civil authority in the restoration of law and order while MACA refers to the deployment of military resources in support of the civil authority.
2. The objective of this chapter is to provide the student an understanding of the doctrine and principles of IS as well as the principles that guide the use of the military in aid of the civil authority. It will also introduce the students to unrest, techniques and the nature of incidents.

## **PRINCIPLES AND DOCTRINE OF INTERNAL SECURITY**

3. **Principles of IS Operations:**
  - a. **Timeliness.** The destructive nature of crises, the speed at which they spread and the uncertainty, risks and damages that manifest in tension, demand that response to crisis by the government and security forces should be swift and effective. Timeliness does not only relate to the speed of commitment of troops but also the relevance of such action in terms of time and space.

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Continuous monitoring and evaluation of events, contingency planning and correct force structure are all characteristics of timeliness.

b. **Cooperation.** In IS operations, several actors are involved. Apart from the police and the military, the civil authorities and other security agencies fuse into a whole effort. A clear political aim shared by the civil authorities and the security agencies would facilitate joint efforts. Other ways of achieving cooperation include interaction by participants before and during crisis, joint planning, training and exercises, and common understanding of rules and procedures.

c. **Protection.** The risks and uncertainties inherent in IS operations require that adequate measures should be taken to protect life and property as a way of engendering self and public confidence. As much as possible troops should not be unduly exposed to adverse fire as death or injury to any of them may induce unnecessary aggression from the survivors.

d. **Justification.** In IS operations there must be acceptable reason for any action taken. Justification goes beyond the involvement of a particular security agency to the correct level of the employment of force. The threat factor, in spread or intensity, may account for why one security agency and not the other is employed, irrespective of its orientation. Although the police is structured, equipped and trained to cope with internal threats, the employment of the military may be justified if the police is over stretched and have

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requested in writing for the military to take over. Furthermore, there must be justification for all action taken by the Commander on the ground.

e. **Minimum Necessary Force.** The force that could be employed to deal with a crisis situation depends on the situation and circumstances. It is the commander on the ground who determines the amount of force that would be effective in achieving the mission. A clear guide is to avoid “killing a fly with a sledge hammer” or “attacking an elephant with a pen knife”.

f. **Evidence.** During IS operations; whatever action is taken must be justified. Evidences to support action taken must be well marshaled by keeping a diary of events, and maintaining log sheets and occurrences report. The collection of spent cases of ammunition may also help to buttress the evidences, when required. Similarly, documents maintained at the Joint Operation Room and the Field Headquarters would be useful in later inquiry where necessary. These include situation report, intelligence summary, planning map and situation map. See Annexes A-G.

g. **Domination of Area of Operation.** When the military is committed to IS operations, the first task of the commander is to secure a firm base from where he launches out to other areas. Aggressive patrolling within the area of operation and other measures such as the imposition of curfews, control points and road blocks will ensure that only security agencies have

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freedom of action. This principle helps to restore public confidence and support in dominated area inhabited by peaceful citizens.

h. **Prevention.** The only object of the use of force is to suppress further disturbances. Force must never be applied as a reprisal or with punitive intent.

i. **Maintenance of Public Confidence.** To depress the morale of the dissidents, every effort must be made to win and foster public confidence and support.

j. **Legal Obligation.** Members of the Armed Forces must comply with the law and act calmly and impartially.

4. **Operating Principles of IS Operation.** The operating principles of IS operations are as follows:

a. **Civil Authority.** The military will always act in support of the civil authorities.

b. **Cooperation.** There must be cooperation at all levels, in every sphere and at every step with the civil authority. The police and military must work together as a team.

5. **Doctrine of IS Operations.** There are 2 doctrines of IS operations as follows:

a. **Containment In situ.** Containment in situ is a doctrine, which focuses on attempts directed at isolating crisis areas while quick actions are initiated to



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put a stop to external manifestation. It ensures that a crisis is not allowed to spread outside the locale of occurrences. Containment in situ involves the use of the security agencies in controlling crisis area, establishment of roadblocks, and the commitments of troops to deal decisively with potential and real rioters. Other ingredients of the doctrine include the designation of crises areas as "Flash Points".

b. **De-escalation Ante.** De-escalation ante"entails a simultaneous process of considering various courses of actions, including military as well as political and socio-economic options to ameliorate the crisis. It involves preparedness to make concessions or seeksolutions that is not necessarily military. In this instance, the military force takes the back stage without losing its impact on the crisis situation.

### **PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY AID TO CIVIL AUTHORITY**

6. **Impartiality.** MACA should always be impartial and even-handed; if action is taken against the interest of a particular party, it should only be because of what that party is doing (or not doing) in relation to the law, rather than who they are. This may be described as principled impartiality, in sharp contrast to a simply neutral stance.

7. **Consent.** Consent at the tactical level may be fragile or transitory and some parties or groups may oppose military involvement. The degree of opposition could range from tolerance to direct hostility. Should the level of consent be

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uncertain and the potential for opposition exist, military operations should place emphasis on the promotion and maintenance of consent.

8. **Restraint in the Use of Force.** There are specific MACA that require the use of force such as law enforcement and disaster management. In such MACA, restraint should always be exercised. The appropriate and proportionate level of force in relation to the aim has to be used. The degree of force necessary may be defined as the measured and proportionate application of force sufficient to achieve a specific objective. Authoritative limits for the use of force will be established by law and must be reflected in approved Rules of Engagement. The mere demonstration of the resolve and capability to use force may be all that is necessary.

9. **Primacy of Civil Authority.** Military personnel can only be used on domestic tasks in support of the relevant and legally responsible civil authorities.

10. **Legal Responsibility.** Military personnel employed on MACA remain subject to civil and military laws as well as the plans and procedure laid down by the Appropriate Superior Authority (ASA) or lead organization, regardless of the task in which they are engaged. Imperatively, soldiers should be conversant with the relevant laws guiding MACA.

11. **Last Resort.** Military aid should always be the last resort. In order to preserve the professional integrity of both the NA and the civil authority, it should be established that the use of mutual aid, other law enforcement agencies and the private sector is insufficient or unsuitable for a task before the NA's assistance is sought.

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12. **Capability of Civil Authority.** Sometimes the civil authority lacks the required level of capability to tackle a problem which affects the security and well being of citizens and it is unreasonable to expect it to develop one. The NA could be called upon in such instance to render assistance.

13. **Urgency of the Situation.** The assistance of the NA should be sought when the civil authority has a capability but the need to act is urgent and there is an immediate lack of civil power resources. This does not preclude the need for the organizations to continually assess risks, identify preventive measures and possible emergencies for an integrated plan. Requirement for the military assistance should be based on the prior assessment by the affected organization.

## **UNREST**

14. **Causes of Unrest.** Unrest may manifest in a country as a result of any of or a combination of 2 or more of the following:

- a. Nationalism.
- b. Ideological Difference.
- c. Industrial Disputes.
- d. Racial or Ethnic Rivalry.
- e. Political Disputes.
- f. Land/Boundary Disputes.
- g. Religious Disputes.
- h. Corruption and Maladministration of Government Funds.
- i. Social Famine, Poor Planning and Lack of Facilities.
- j. Extremes of Wealth and Poverty.

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- k. Eviction of Foreign Troops and Bases.
- l. Rumours.
- j. Communal conflict.

15. **Types of Unrest.** Generally, 2 types of unrest have been identified. In each case, the agitator is at the centre of the unrest. The 2 types are:

- a. **Crowd.** A crowd is a large number of persons temporarily congregated. Its members think and act as individuals and are without organization. Although innocent in its origin, nature or purpose, it can develop into a violent group.
- b. **Mob.** It is a crowd whose members, under the stimulus of intense excitement of agitation, may lose their sense of reasoning and respect for law and follow their leaders into lawless acts. Mob behaviour is usually emotional and without reasons.

## **AGITATION TECHNIQUES AND NATURE OF INCIDENTS**

16. **Techniques of the Agitators.** A violent mob can be effectively developed by a trained agitator. There are some techniques usually adopted by agitators to trigger excitement and provide the necessary stimuli to achieve their aim. These include:

- a. **Use of Propaganda.** This is spread through:
  - (1) Newspaper and Magazine Articles.
  - (2) Leaflets and Poster.
  - (3) Radio and TV Broadcasts.
  - (4) Spreading of Rumours.
  - (5) Aggravating natural prejudices, desires

and grievances.

b. **Incitement by a Fiery Speaker.**

- (1) Brings his listeners to a high emotional peak.
- (2) Justifies a course of action.

c. **Appearance of an Irritating Object or Individual.** An example is a newspaper photograph depicting alleged brutality by security forces.

d. **A Successful Accomplishment of an Act of Violence.** The success of an act is attempted since failure dulls interest of most people.

e. **Use of an Emotion Provoking Rumour.** Emotion provoking rumour increases the tempo of disorder and can incite an orderly demonstration to violence.

17. **Nature of Incidents.** Regardless of the reason for violence, mob actions can be extremely destructive. Generally, the nature of incidents when a crowd becomes a mob take the form of the following:

- a. Disturbances (looting, strikes, arson etc).
- b. Murder attacks, including assassinations.
- c. Ambushes.
- d. Sabotage - against essential services etc.
- e. Verbal abuse in the form of obscene remarks, taunts, ridicule and jeers to annoy security forces and cause them to take action that may be exploited later as an act of brutality.
- f. Attacks on personnel and vehicles to cause

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bodily injuries and damage to property.

g. Throwing object from windows, roof tops or covered places.

h. Dangerous moving objects against troops to breach roadblocks and barricades.

i. Setting fire to buildings or motor vehicles in order to block troop's movement.

j. Use of explosive devices including letter bombs, booby traps, etc, to:

(1) Injure/kill troops and VIPs.

(2) Block routes.

(3) Breach Rivers/dam to flood an area.

(4) Block under passes.

k. Directing weapons fire against troops.

l. Use of remote means to remove barriers and barricades.

m. Use of women, children and elderly people with the aim of playing on the sympathy of the troops and discouraging them from taking counter measures (human shield). When counter measures are taken by the troops, the agitators may take photographs to whip up public animosity.

### **Annexes:**

- A. Specimen Diary of Events.
- B. Outline of a Log Sheet.
- C. Specimen Occurrence Report.
- D. Specimen SITREP.
- E. Specimen INTSUM.
- F. Contents of a Planning map.
- G. Contents of a Situation map.

**SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS**

1. State and explain the principles of IS.
2. State and explain the causes of unrest.
3. What techniques do trained agitators employ to trigger off excitement and gain mass support?
4. What incidents are likely to occur when a crowd is worked into a mob?
5. What are the operating principles in the maintenance of law and order?
6. What are the principles of MACA?

## **CHAPTER 3**

# **PHASES OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND PREPARATORY GOVERNMENT ACTIONS**

## **INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE**

1. The nature and characteristics of crisis do not take to particular pattern. Situations evolve over time from a period of uneasy calm to a state of complete disorder. As the situation deteriorates, government begins to activate measures that set the stage for the eventual deployment of military forces in aid to civil authority.
2. The objective of this chapter is to enable students identify the phases of IS operations and the various actions of government including emergency legislations that often give both military and civil authorities special powers. These special powers permit restrictions which could otherwise be seen as infringement on individual human rights.

## **PHASES OF INTERNAL SECURITY**

3. **Situation Development Phase.** The Situation Development Phase may be described as a period of uneasy peace. Critical and objective monitoring of the situation is carried out by all the security agencies and information is made available to the political leadership. All the factors associated with the conflict situations, which are likely to develop into crisis are logged and analysed to provide directions for government decisions at all levels. The key



actions in this phase are effective monitoring and pre-emptive measures to forestall crisis eruptions and further threats.

4. **Information Management Phase.** At the stage when eruption of crisis is imminent, most or all of the security agencies and institutions shall contribute critical information on all internal conflicts, crisis and emerging situation. Security agencies shall maintain channels of information/intelligence analysis and dissemination for the purpose of coordination and control by the appropriate superior authority. All the channels must employ professional judgment in the management of critical information element available to them in order to achieve objectivity, speed and effectiveness. In this phase of information management, the military command shall be taking appropriate and relevant measures to beef up its readiness for IS operations. Joint training of security forces may commence at this stage, and where security permits, military presence and or show of force in designated flash points may be authorised.

5. **Police Intervention Phase.** When a crisis situation escalates and grows in intensity, the police shall in its professional judgement intervene and reasonably apply any or all the options available to it. At the Police Headquarters, a Joint Operations Room shall be established in which representative of the military and the Department of State Services shall have unrestricted access. A Field Joint Operations Room shall also be established at the nearest Divisional Police Station within the crisis environment. At this phase, the military shall commence to rehearse all military courses of action should it be invited, while other agencies continue to monitor and evaluate the situation. When the

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crisis situation is deemed to be getting out of police control, the Department of State Services shall advise the State Commissioner of Police to accept that a military intervention is required. If the Commissioner of Police fails to oblige, the LGC shall advise the Governor to write to the President to deploy the military. The President in his wisdom and advice from the NSC shall call in the military to undertake IS operations.

6. **Military Intervention Phase.** When the military is invited to intervene in a crisis situation, the local army commander assumes command of the operations, upon the hand over to him by the Police. The local commander should, however, obtain approval from the appropriate superior authority before embarking on the symbolic handover from the police. The army commander may establish a Field Operations Room in which all briefings are done. The military commander shall employ all legitimate means and measures to effectively bring the crisis situation under control. At the end of the operations, the military shall hand over the situation to the Police. Some of his responsibilities include the following:

- a. Appraising and re-appraising the situation with the police and government representatives.
- b. Establishing logistic arrangement to cater for the crisis situation.
- c. Protection of key and vulnerable points.
- d. Effective management of the dead, wounded and displaced persons.
- e. Ensure effective command and control of all participants involved in the suppression of the crisis.

7. **Consolidation Phase.** At the end of the military intervention, the situation should be handed over to the police and the entire operation reverts to it. At this phase, records of events including the dead, prisoners, wounded civilian, displaced persons and all the seized items should be handed over to the police. The intervention of the National Emergency Management Agency would also be required at this stage to work out and attend to the needs of all those adversely affected by the crisis. Although the military have handed over at this stage, it may be required to maintain presence and if possible perform complimentary roles to the police for sometimes.

8. **Re-Appraisal Phase.** In the Re-appraisal phase, the government shall establish a judicial inquiry to look into the totality of the crisis. This shall include the remote and immediate causes of the crisis with a view to apportion blames and prevent future occurrences. All the security agencies involved in the IS operations shall testify as witnesses in the enquiry.

## **PREPARATORY GOVERNMENT ACTIONS**

9. **Contingency Plans.** In a deteriorating security situation, the government and the civil authorities must be aware of impending crisis. Some indicators such as theft of arms and explosives, bank robberies, strikes with political backing, seditious pamphlets, rumours and propaganda are usually indicators needed by the government to evolve contingency plans.

Preparatory actions include:

- a. Formulation of long term political objectives.

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- b. Reviewing the machinery for information gathering and for countering propaganda.
- c. Overhauling security measures related to identifying and interpreting indicators.
- d. Integrating and expanding the intelligence and security services.
- e. Drafting emergency legislation.
- f. Establishment of joint defence scheme.
- g. Drawing up lists of key points and vulnerable points.
- h. Use of the police for their duties such as:
  - (1) Crime investigation.
  - (2) Beat duties.
  - (3) Traffic control.
  - (4) Guarding important locations.
  - (5) Provision of escorts.
  - (6) Proffering of charges and immediate court action against offenders.
- i. Planning operations which may require civil and military coordination, e.g. measures to isolate insurgents and maintain essential services which may make enormous demand on operational military units.

10. **Declaration of State of Emergency.** The President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on conditions specified in the Constitution may declare a state of emergency all over Nigeria, or part thereof. The State Governor may request the President to declare a state of emergency throughout the state or part thereof. A state of emergency bestows special powers to security agencies and denial of certain fundamental rights of citizens such as:

- a. Imposition of curfew.
- b. Authority to search without warrants.

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- c. Declaration of special areas out of bound to unauthorized persons.
- d. Detention without trial.

11. **Implications of State of Emergency.** The implications of a state of emergency are as follows:

- a. The insurgency may profit by presenting restrictions as oppressive and an infringement on individual liberty.
- b. All restrictive measures empowered by the state of emergency places strain on democracy.
- c. The insurgents are likely to exploit public disquiet and may even devise ways of evading restrictions.
- d. Severe action by the government can be counter productive as it can generate sympathetic opinion within and outside the country.

12. **Application of State of Emergency.** The President can proclaim a state of emergency when:

- a. The country is in imminent danger of invasion or involvement in a state of war.
- b. There is actual breakdown of law and order and there is need to impose measures to restore peace and security.
- c. There is a clear and present danger of an actual breakdown of public order and public safety in the country or any part, requiring extraordinary measures to avert it.
- d. There is an occurrence or imminent danger of the occurrence of a disaster or natural calamity, affecting the community or part of the community.

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- e. There is any other public danger which clearly constitutes a threat to the existence of the country.
- f. The President receives and accepts a request from the Governor of a State where there is an existence of any of the situations in sub-paragraph (a- e) above in the State.

### **THREAT LEVELS**

Threat Levels		Response	
<b>Critical</b>	An attack is expected imminently	Exceptional	Maximum protective security measures to meet specific threats and to minimise vulnerability and risk. Critical may also be used if a nuclear attack is expected.
<b>Severe</b>	An attack is highly likely	Heightened	Additional and sustainable protective security measures reflecting the broad nature of the threat combined with specific business and geographical vulnerabilities and judgements on acceptable risk.
<b>Substantial</b>	An attack is a strong possibility		
<b>Moderate</b>	An attack is possible, but not likely	Normal	Routine protective security measures appropriate to the situation.
<b>Low</b>	An attack is unlikely.		

**SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS**

1. What are the phases of IS.
2. Explain any 4 of them.
3. In a deteriorating security situation, what do you see the government doing to restore normalcy before the situation gets out of hand.
4. When can a state of emergency be declared by The President.

## **CHAPTER 4**

# **PROCEDURE FOR THE INDUCTION OF NA TROOPS INTO OPERATIONS**

## **INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES**

1. The procedure for inducting troops of the NA into all types of operations internally and externally, serve as the authority outlining the functions of the various staff branches, unit and formations involved in the induction process. The procedure will specify the inter-relationship between the stakeholders in the process and specify conditions under which NA troops should be inducted into operations.
2. The objective of this chapter is to provide students an understanding of the induction procedure that ensures the political directives to employ military force is clearly understood, troops understand their mission, the appropriate force level, equipment and logistics are available for induction.

## **THE INDUCTION PROCESS**

3. The induction process would be deemed to have been activated on receipt by the COAS of a mission statement or directive (usually from/ through CDS) from the President, Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces or his representative to use military force. The C-in-C consults the HMOD and directives are relayed down to the CDS, COAS, GOC, Bde Comd and Unit to be inducted



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4. Once the political directive and mission statement are received, the COAS confers with his PSO as to derive the military mission. This may just be a formality if prior to the mission statement there exists a contingency plan. In that circumstance, the aim would be just to confirm the mission. While this is going on, the DATOPS sends out a warning order to the formation that will provide the units to be inducted. At the same time, the units in the Operation Training Areas (OTA) intensify their preparations.

5. Concurrently, DAPP will confirm if more equipment are required for the operation and if so, whether such equipment are available. The DOAA also confirms if specialist personnel are required. DOAL, on the other hand, carries out a detailed logistics staff check of the requirements and prepares to make good any deficiencies in clothing, defence store, and combat supplies. The DMI makes available necessary intelligence on the enemy and the area of operation in conjunction with the CCE.

6. The GOC of the division tasked to provide troops relays the mission to the relevant bde comd who ensures that the units earmarked for such operation are in a state of readiness consistent with the mission. The bde in turn passes on the relevant information to the tasked unit or units. The unit intensifies preparation for induction.

## **THE UNIT**

7. **Pre-Induction**. The activities a unit will be carrying out during pre-induction are as follows:

- a. Monitors the physical and medical fitness of all personnel.
- b. X-checks the clothing, kits and personal weapons of all personnel.
- c. Conducts a readiness check on unit before and after movement into the OTA.
- d. Makes a check-list of all the unit requirements and ensures they are all obtained before moving into OTA.
- e. Compiles deficiencies and make them available to the Bde.
- f. Continuously tests functionality and accuracy of arms and weapons.
- g. X-checks individual ration requirement and ensures soldiers have the first line scale.
- h. Ensures that unit has first line requirement of ammo.
- i. Conducts mandatory physical and medical tests on those with questionable medical and physical fitness status.
- j. Gets the unit to thoroughly understand terrain and environment of the projected mission area.
- k. Ensures the unit acquires a good understanding of the people in the projected mission area.
- l. Perfects training on tactics, patrols, ambush and handling of PWs.
- m. Ensures the unit thoroughly understands the content of unit SOP.
- n. Rehearses communication drills and ensures that

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vertical and lateral links are functional.

- o. Carries out Loss in Action (LIA) procedure to ensure that troops can rejoin unit when any personnel is LIA.
- p. Ensures that maps obtained are up to date and troops understand the geography of the area.
- q. Carries out movement drill and rehearses replenishment procedures.
- r. Concentrates on the mission and allow the system to provide the necessary support.
- s. Thoroughly understands the rules of engagement and other, UN, AU or ECOWAS mission requirements.
- t. Rehearses tactical movement and educates the troops on the dangers of fraternizing with locals unduly in the mission area.
- u. Ensure proper rear area communication in base area.
- v. Arranges mode of mail delivery to families in base area.
- w. Ensures that specific arrangements are made in the rear to solve any problems that may arise in the base area.
- x. Ensure that the unit is at the best state of readiness consistent with the requirements of the impending mission.
- y. Educates troops on the need to communicate frequently with their families once in operation area.
- z. Arranges for family allotment so the wives/relatives can draw salaries of their spouses while they are in mission area.
- aa. Assembles personnel who are conversant with

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the spoken language of the projected area of operation and ensure that key words are known.

8. **At Induction.** The activities a unit will be carrying out during induction are as follows:

- a. Ensure that the unit has its first line scale and other requirements needed for the operation.
- b. Fills the state of readiness responsibility form and forward to higher headquarters.
- c. Fills the defect and deficiency liability form and forward to ASA.
- d. Fills the medical and physical status forms.
- e. Ensures that troops are conversant with the mission and the efforts required for its attainment.
- f. Completes a state of readiness form and return to ASA.
- g. Communicates damages and deficiencies in equipment and material on arrival at the FOB.
- h. Ensures that messing and ration are timely and in the correct quality and quantity.
- i. Physically inspects and ascertains that ration provided meets the NA standards.
- j. Quickly alerts ASA if provision of ration becomes a problem.
- k. Requests for special equipment where necessary.
- l. Confirms status of first line combat supplies.

9. **Post Induction.** The activities a unit will be carrying out in the post –induction period are as follows:

- a. Keeps records of the units performances in all

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operations.

- b. Maintain accurate casualty records in men and equipment.
- c. Carries out proper burial of personnel KIA.
- d. Sends necessary returns on personnel shortfall and state of equipment.
- e. Carries out proper documentation of personnel MIA.
- f. Sends regular INTREPs and SITREPs to higher HQ.
- g. Arranges leave and passes for all ranks on conclusion of assigned task.
- h. Commences preparation for relief-in-line.
- i. Alerts ASA on the expiration of the period of mandate.
- j. Maintains a daily account of units diary.
- k. Ensures that equipment, vehicles and other stores are back loaded in good condition after the operation.

### **SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS**

- 1 Briefly explain the induction process at the headquarters levels.
- 2. Enumerate 10 activities of a unit at the time of :
  - a. Pre – Induction.
  - b. Induction.
  - c. Post induction.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **RULES OF ENGAGEMENT**

#### **INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE**

1. When the NA is dealing with crime or assisting the civil authorities to restore law and order during a crisis situation, it is under obligation to strictly observe relevant provisions of the laws of the country. These include legal procedures for dealing with riots and unlawful assembly, powers of search and arrest, and the use of force.
2. The objective of this chapter is to provide the student an understanding of the circumstance in which force can be applied during IS operation and the degree of force permissible as well as the relevance of evidence in IS operations.

#### **GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF FORCE**

3. In principle, force may be used provided it is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances, and in the exercise of powers of arrest and quelling of disturbances. The catch phrase "the use of minimum necessary force" gives the soldier a clearer and safer guide to the use of force. A soldier may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstance, for the prevention of crime and making lawful arrest. In a crisis situation, there is no hard and fast rule to determine whether a particular degree of force would be reasonable. The commander on the ground should decide taking the prevailing circumstances into account. He and his troops are responsible

for their actions, hence the need to act in the spirit of humanity.

4. **Guidelines.** The following guidelines should be observed in the use of force:

- a. Force must not be used at all unless it is necessary.
- b. Force is unjustifiable unless the immediate effect can be achieved by using it within the soldier's or policeman's legal power.
- c. No force may be used than is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.
- d. The degree of force cannot be reasonable if it is more than is required to achieve the immediate aim.
- e. Force must never be used for punitive purpose or as deterrence for the future.

5. **Factors to Consider about Majority of Civilians.**

Attention is usually given to the use of deadly force for the purpose of preventing activities which do not pose a significant threat or risk of death or serious bodily harm such as against curfew violators, looters etc where deadly force cannot be justified. Soldiers committed to IS operations must therefore remember the following factors about the vast majority of civilians:

- a. They are decent, law abiding and they deplore civil disorder.
- b. They have respect for the security agencies and would generally cooperate with them.
- c. That suspects are citizens therefore should not be treated as enemy combatants.
- d. Soldiers represent the Federal Government, so

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the impression of the civilians will depend on the behaviour of the soldiers they are in contact with.

e. Soldiers must also remain alert to their surrounding especially owing to threats from IED bearing civilians who may pose as common agitators.

6. **Use of Force in Arrest.** The law provides that in effecting or assisting in a lawful arrest of an offender or suspect or person unlawfully at large, a person could use minimum necessary force. Force may be used not only against the person who is being arrested, but also against any other person who is physically preventing or obstructing an arrest. A soldier cannot justify opening fire to effect the arrest of hooligans who are not armed, but handcuffs and bands may be applied on an unarmed person who is being arrested. Troops should never react to verbal abuse or resort to the use of provocative or threatening language when making an arrest.

7. **Evidence after the Use of Force.** Whenever a soldier uses force, it is important that he should be able to justify it and give reasons for the amount of force used in the circumstances. He may be required in a court of law to give his justification in great detail. The need to record events as they unfold and actions taken at each stage are paramount to the justification for the use of force. It should be noted that it is the soldier that uses force himself rather than his superiors, who would have to make such justifications. However, section 102 and 103 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) absolves an officer who lawfully uses force in good faith.



## **THE USE OF FIREARMS**

8. Owing to the deadly effect of firearms and the serious consequences which can ensue from their wrongful use, it is important that the circumstances in which they are used can be justified.
9. The following points should be borne in mind when using firearms:
  - a. The use of firearms should be confined to situations where there is an immediate threat to life and property or if an attack led to the death or serious injury to those in the charge of the troops and there is no other way of restoring the situation.
  - b. The use of firearms represents an application of minimum necessary force in the circumstance.
  - c. Adequate warning of intent to open fire should be given if possible but may only be opened without warning when hostile fire had commenced or when delay could lead to death or serious injury of those who it is the troops' duty to protect.
  - d. When no other course is open, it would be reasonable for a soldier to shoot and protect himself or other servicemen or others whom it is his duty to protect from real and immediate threat to death or actions resulting to serious bodily injuries.
  - e. A soldier can open fire also to defend property or persons, which is his duty to guard and protect from forcible crime, which could result in serious damage to the property or injury to persons.

## **SPONTANEOUS RESPONSE IN CRISIS SITUATIONS**

10. Spontaneous response in IS operations derives from section 101, 102 and 103 of the CPC. The sections recognize the destructive and spreading nature of riots, and the need for those in a position to act to do so without resorting to formal authorization channel.

11. Section 101 of the CPC empowers any Justice of Peace, a Police Officer above the rank of an Assistant Superintendent or any commissioned officer of the Armed Forces of the Federation to command any unlawful assembly or any assembly of five or more persons likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace to disperse.

12. Section 102 of the CPC empowers the above mentioned persons to apply force to disperse the assembly and may require the assistance of any male person for the purpose of dispersing such assembly and if necessary arrest and confine such persons that form part of it. Section 103 of the CPC guarantees protection against prosecution except where the Attorney General directs otherwise.

## **SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS**

1. What are the guidelines on the use of force in IS.
2. Certain points must be borne in mind when using firearms. State them.
3. What is spontaneous response in crises situation.

## **CHAPTER 6**

# **MILITARY TASKS IN INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS**

## **INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE**

1. The military is assigned various tasks during IS situations. These tasks fall under its constitutional roles in aid of civil authority and therefore have the necessary legal backings.
2. The objective of this chapter is to provide the student with an understanding of all the tasks the military is required to perform when invited to intervene in an IS situation. The tasks discussed here are not exhaustive as situations could arise that require new methods based on prevailing circumstances.

## **CROWD DISPERSAL**

3. The aim of crowd dispersal is to prevent a crowd from assembling or re-assembling. A peaceful gathering can turn violent if the leader of the crowd loses control and hooligans and hoodlums take over. The speed at which the troops arrive at the scene of a disturbance may prevent the deterioration of the situation.
4. The handling of a crowd can be through non-violent or violent method:
  - a. **Non-Violent Method.** The non-violent method

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involves oral persuasion, warning of the crowd through the reading of the Riot Act and advancing in strength by the troops towards the crowd as a show of force. The use of box formation, which provides all round protection, is a technique that is still useful while dispersing low-key protesters. Current realities also require that troops maintain reasonable distance from the crowd at all time as defence against suicide person borne attacks.

b. **Violent Method.** A more violent and riotous crowd would attract the use of Tear Gas/CS riot control agent as a prelude to opening fire. Before ordering troops to open fire, the military commander should take the following action:

- (1) Warn the crowd (as mentioned above).
- (2) Indicate particular target to the troops.
- (3) Conceal the identity of the marksman by ordering the whole section to take aim.
- (4) Obtain evidence to complete the diary of events including collecting and counting empty cartridges.

5. **Opening of Fire.** Further warning of the intention to open fire is not necessary if the following circumstances exist:

- a. Casualty has been recorded and lives are in danger.
- b. While defending a person under attack and there is no other way to save his life.
- c. As the last option to re-arrest a person who escapes from lawful custody for felony.

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- d. As the last option to arrest a person whose offence carries a penalty of 7 years imprisonment or death.

### **VULNERABLE POINT GUARD**

6. The tasks of Vulnerable Points (VP) guard are to prevent damages, arson or looting and to ensure the maintenance of essential services and utilities. Troops assigned to VPs are to remain at their duty post and should not be called upon to assist elsewhere.

7. A VP guard should not be less than a section and should be commanded by an NCO of the rank of a corporal. The guard commander must be given clear and explicit written orders covering the following:

- a. Task.
- b. Description of the VP and liaison arrangement with the police and the workers within the VP.
- c. Location of entrances and installation to be guarded or visited by patrols.
- d. Action on code words.
- e. Action when VP is approached by unauthorized persons.
- f. Action when VP is in danger of damage, looting or arson.
- g. Circumstances in which fire may be opened.
- h. Arrangement for reinforcement.
- i. Communication.

8. The orders for the sentries at VP guard should include

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the following:

- a. The scale of ammunition to be carried, charging of magazines, loading, position of safety catch/lever.
- b. Challenging.
- c. Action when approached by unauthorized persons
- d. Action when VP is in danger of damage, looting and arson.
- e. Opening fire.
- f. Checking of passes against specimen issued.
- g. Means of identification of workers.

9. It would be reasonable for troops on VP guard, when persuasion fails, to shoot and protect themselves, other servicemen or others whom it is their duty to protect from immediate threat of death or actions that may result to serious bodily injuries. They could also open fire to protect the VP from forcible crime, which could result in serious damage to property.

### **ROADBLOCKS**

10. During IS operations roadblocks, deliberate or snap, are set up for the following reasons:

- a. Maintain continuous check on road movement.
- b. Apprehend wanted persons and couriers.
- c. Prevent the smuggling of arms and ammunitions.

11. Although roadblocks cause inconveniences and even

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fear, citizens should be made to understand their utility and preventive nature. Every person manning a roadblock must know his job thoroughly and act quickly and methodically to prevent delay to legitimate traffic. Troops should show politeness and consideration at all times, and wanton damage to vehicles and property should never be tolerated. As much as possible, at least two soldiers knowledgeable in searching vehicles and persons should always be employed. Provision must also be made for female searchers. Roadblocks should not be in place for too long, otherwise the usefulness may be lost. Procedures for searching cars, buses, goods vehicles, motorcycles and bicycles are at Annex A.

### **CONTROL POINTS**

12. When the NA is directed to assist the civil authorities, control points should be set up in the crisis area to restrict the movement of vehicles and pedestrians, and to help maintain law and order. Control points are to be established in a manner that the protesting crowd is canalized into areas where arrest can be effected easily. The main tasks of controlpoint troops are as follows:

- a. Control vehicular and pedestrian traffic so that large crowds cannot assemble, known offenders can be arrested and curfew can be enforced.
- b. Dominate the crisis area around the control points and maintain law and order by preventing damage to property or injury to persons, dispersing unlawful assemblies and local patrolling.

13. The number of roads to be controlled and the number of traffic lanes in each road are the factors that influence the strength of a control point. A rifle platoon is an ideal strength at a control point and its composition is as follows:

- a. Control Point HQ.
- b. Barrier Sentries.
- c. Covering Party.
- d. Standing Patrol.
- e. Civil Policemen.
- f. Female Searchers.
- g. Local Reserve.

14. Specimen headings for Control Point orders is at Annex B.

### **GUARDING OF IMPORTANT PERSONS**

15. In IS operations troops may have to undertake the protection of Very Important Personalities (VIP) whose death or injury could have adverse repercussions or be of tremendous propaganda value to the insurgents' cause.

16. If a VIP has to travel by road, he should be provided with a full escort divided into a vanguard, close escort and rear guard. Communication with the operational base and group inter-link should be provided. Other measures that may be considered for VIP protection include the following:

- a. Provision of armoured protection to the VIP.
- b. Removal of any distinguishing/identifying marks on the person and vehicle of the VIP.



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- c. Getting the vehicle of the VIP out of danger by the close escort in the event of attack.
- d. Provision of air cover and making dummy and live runs along the route against ambush positions.
- e. Secrecy about the details of the movement for as long as possible.
- f. Publicity for the visit on the departure of the VIP as a propaganda stunt.

### **CORDON AND SEARCH**

17. Cordon and search is a combined police and military operation. It is organized, based on good intelligence and should be pre-planned in detail and rehearsed. While the police may control a small search, the NA should control a search involving a battalion or more.

18. Every soldier taking part in a cordon and search must be clearly briefed about his responsibilities and methods of approach. Troops for cordon and search are organized into parties as follows:

- a. Cordon troops who surround the area to be searched.
- b. Outer cordon troops who are deployed to cover likely approaches, some distance away to prevent interference from outside the isolated area.
- c. Search parties that carry out the search of houses and inhabitants.
- d. Cage troops who erect and guard cages for holding persons awaiting interrogations.
- e. Escort troops who escort wanted persons to a place of detention after interrogation.

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- f. Road block troops who stop and prevent traffic trying to enter the isolated area.
- g. A reserve of troops that may be required to deal with the unexpected.

### **CURFEW**

19. Imposition of curfew is a task that is undertaken to allow security forces easy access to and within a crisis area. In order for a curfew to succeed the following conditions should be met:

- a. It must be complete and there must be sufficient troops to enforce it.
- b. It must be rapidly executed and surprise achieved.
- c. It must be well timed to take care of the following:
  - (1) When inhabitants normally get up, go to and return from work.
  - (2) When shops are normally opened and closed.

20. The sequence of imposition of curfew is summarized as follows:

- a. The civil authority takes decision on the imposition of curfew in consultation with the police and military commanders.
- b. Plans are made to cover timings, areas, boundaries, troops required and administrative arrangements.
- c. A combined police and military curfew control headquarters is established.
- g. Cordon parties, road and static patrols move

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rapidly into position.

h. The curfew is announced by the appropriate means e.g. press, radio, television, siren and police announcement by loudhailer.

21. It is important to anticipate the major administrative problems that may arise as a result of the imposition of curfew. These include the following:

- a. Lack of water in house.
- b. The reduction of essential food and the time required each day to replenish stock.
- c. Essential food deliveries in areas where there are shops.
- d. Clearance of refuse from houses and streets.
- e. Fuel supplies.
- f. Treatment of the sick.
- g. Care of animals.
- h. Care of crops.
- i. Lack of indoor sanitation.

22. Consideration must be accorded the administration of civilian in crisis area. The efforts of security forces at relieving some of the stress of curfew may win the confidence of the populace.

### **OTHER TASKS**

23. **Patrolling.** In crisis situations, agitators are often elusive and fleeting, therefore, there is the need to locate their hideout through continuous and offensive patrolling. Patrolling may take place in the urban areas, rural setting, creeks, jungles and by air. Helicopter patrols are particularly

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useful, because of the inherent characteristics of communication and mobility, apart from the intelligence it gathers. All patrols should have clearly defined missions, and the local commander should avail himself of an aide-memoire. Specimen Patrol Order aide-memoires is at Annex C.

24. **Domination of Rooftops.** Standing patrols or sentries are posted on rooftops in order to dominate troubled areas or to serve as an integral part of every control point. Their primary task is to observe the movement of crowds, curfew breakers, and to direct patrolling helicopters or troops on the ground. Rooftop patrol should include at least one policeman, a non-commissioned officer and 3 or 4 privates. The patrol can only open fire in self defence or to protect military properties.

25. **Sweep.** Sweep is an important activity that troops often have to perform during IS operations. It relates to the searching of an area thoroughly and making sure that no adversary remains undetected in it or is about to escape. Troops available for sweep should be divided into 3 groups, stop party, sweep party and reserve. The stop party secures the area by stealth, the sweeps party carries out the search, and the reserve remains on standby for emergencies.

26. **Piquetting.** Piquetting is an IS operation designed to safeguard movement along road tracks in hilly areas. The piquetting force is organized into the following components:

- a. Advance Guard - Clears the axis and provide piquetting troops.
- b. Main Body - Takes over when the advance guard is committed.

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- c. Rear Guard - Protects the rear and calls forward the piquets.
- d. Where possible, armoured cars should be included in the advance and rear guards.

27. **Ambushes.** Ambushes are laid to enable troops engage the adversary on the ground and circumstances of their choosing. Ambushes may take place by day or night, and can be immediate or deliberate. Immediate ambush should only be laid in areas where civilian movement by night is prohibited. Although an ambush relies on good intelligence, other requirements include the following:

- a. A high standard of training.
- b. Careful planning and rehearsal.
- c. Security and secrecy.
- d. Concealment.
- e. Intelligent layout and sitting.
- f. Battle discipline.
- g. Determination to wait and kill the adversary.
- h. Simple clear cut plan for springing ambush.
- i. Shooting skill.

28. **Tracking.** After an ambush or an aggressive patrolling, there is often the need to pursue fleeing miscreants who are injured. In most cases the fleeing culprits leave trails behind which experienced trackers with or without dogs can follow. Owing to the special nature of tasks given to ambush parties and patrols, trained trackers are provided for each group. Sometimes, native trackers may be employed to lead the patrols, but the troops must remain alert for their own safety.

29. **Rescue Operations.**

**Annexes:**

- A. Procedures for searching vehicles.
- B. Specimen headings for control point orders.
- C. Specimen patrol order aide memoire.

**SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS**

- 1. Enumerate the various military tasks during IS operations.
- 2. Describe the violent and non-violent methods of crowd dispersal.
- 3. At what instances can a soldier open fire during crowd dispersal.
- 4. What are the measures to consider for VIP protection.
- 5. The order to a vulnerable point guard commander must be in writing, clear and explicit. What are the contents of such order.
- 6. What are the parties into which a cordon and search troop is organised.
- 7. What is piquetting.
- 8. What are the requirements for staging a successful ambush.
- 9. What conditions must be met for an imposed curfew to succeed.

## **CHAPTER 7**

# **MILITARY PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS**

## **INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE**

1. Internal Security operations demand elaborate preparations. Therefore, NA formations and units carry out several activities to plan and prepare for every anticipated occurrence.
2. The objective of this chapter is to provide the student an understanding of the planning and preparation required for the deployment of troops in any IS situation.

## **PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS**

3. **Planning.** In order to balance comprehensiveness with simplicity of plans, local commanders should prepare aide-memoiré to cover many forms of activities that are likely to be undertaken within the area of crisis. The outline plan should cover the following:
  - a. Establishment of Joint Operation Headquarters.
  - b. Assessment of the various types of disturbances that are likely to develop within the area of crisis.
  - c. A list of vulnerable points in the crisis area.
  - d. Sectorization of the area on the basis of geopolitical and/or sociological factors.
  - e. The strength of forces and actions required to

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control and suppress incidents in each sector.

- f. Anticipated tasks and earmarking the troops to tasks.
- g. Reconnaissance.
- h. Logistic details including combat supply, replenishment of stores, troop movement, reception, accommodation, maintenance of vehicles and materials etc.
- i. Handling of civilians and displaced persons.
- J. Assistance and reinforcement.
- k. Communication details.
- l. Procedures for handing over between Police and the Military.
- m. Training and rehearsals including location and timings.

4. **Preparations**. Beyond contingency planning which will need an understanding of the contemporary threat as well as of events as they develop, the most usual forms of military preparations are:
- a. Increase in the tempo of research and development on weapons, equipment and tactics.
  - b. Training in special skills required for counter revolutionary operations in the area concerned.
  - c. Liaison with the local civil intelligence agencies.
  - d. Reinforcement of these civil intelligence agencies if required.
  - e. Joint training with police including Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) matters.

## **INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS**

5. **Critical Items of Information**. The following items



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of information should be known about a potential adversary:

- a. Objectives of the adversary.
- b. Identity of individuals, groups or organizations likely to create or sponsor the disturbances.
- c. Likely meeting areas.
- d. Presence and location of known leaders and agitators.
- e. Likely sympathizers.
- f. Estimated number of people likely to be involved.
- g. Source, and location of arms, equipment and supplies available to the leaders.
- h. Success in any counter revolutionary operation also depends on understanding the language, topography, political historical, sociological and economic background of the crisis and insurgents.

6. **Sources of Information**. The common sources of information during IS operations are:

- a. Other intelligence agencies- SSS, DIA, NIA.
- b. Civil law enforcement agencies – police, Civil Defence etc.
- c. Newspapers, magazines, radio and TV.
- d. Planning and Situation Maps ( See Annexes A and B).
- e. Photographs.
- f. Aerial reconnaissance.
- f. Patrols.
- g. Unit personnel residing in the area.
- h. Prison records.

## **TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT**

7. **Training Required.** The following aspects of training will be carried out in the units, preparatory to IS operations. This training is though not exhaustive:

- a. Infantry training.
- b. Immediate action drills.
- c. PT and endurance walk.
- d. Field craft/Tactics.
- e. Cordon and search techniques.
- f. Radio communications (especially voice procedure).
- g. Intelligence organization and training.
- h. First aid.
- i. Crowd dispersal drill.
- j. Handing/Taking Over (from police) drills.
- k. Patrolling.
- l. Minor engineer tasks.
- m. Air mobility.
- n. Ambush drills.
- o. Court procedures.
- p. Language training.
- q. Interview techniques (the press).
- r. Community relations.
- s. Dangers of hostile propaganda and counter measures.
- t. Leadership.
- u. Night operations, casualty evacuation and navigation.
- v. Arrest procedures and handling of suspects.
- w. Recognition techniques for people, vehicles, terrorist, equipment etc.
- x. Counter IED drills.

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- y. Identification and recognition of tactical drones and UXOs.
- z. Rescue Operations.

8. **Modification of Training.** The factors and guiding rules that will influence modification of training in a unit include the fol:

a. **Factors.**

- (1) Insurgent habits, operational methods and equipment.
- (2) Limitations on the use of force.
- (3) Topography.

b. **Guiding Rules.**

- (1) Leadership and battle discipline (Junior leadership to be emphasized).
- (2) Immediate action.
- (3) Weapon training to be continuous.
- (4) Safety-safe handling of weapons to prevent unnecessary loss of lives.
- (5) Physical fitness and endurance.

9. **Stores and Equipment Required.** A commander charged with the responsibility of conducting IS operation is at liberty to carry whatever equipment he may require to effectively achieve the task. He may require some or all of the under listed:

- a. Field Kitchen.
- b. Jerricans.
- c. Insulators.
- d. Camp kettle.

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- e. Shovels.
- f. Wire binding roll.
- g. Wire cutter and gloves.
- h. Water sterilizing outfit.
- i. Stretcher.
- j. Sand bags.
- k. White tape rolls.
- l. Lamps.
- m. Tear gas (if avail).
- n. IS signs.
- o. Tents.
- p. Megaphone.
- q. Pick axes.
- r. Maps and sketches.
- s. Diary.
- t. Stationery (to incl message form, ink, mill boards etc).
- u. Dannert Wire.
- v. Bugles.
- w. Matchets.
- x. Medical box.
- y. Shield wicker.
- z. Whistle.
- aa. Camera.
- bb. Dress: Battle order, steel helmet.
- cc. Ration.
- dd. Radio.
- ee. Night Vision Aids.
- ff. Body scanners.
- gg. Vehicle scanners.
- hh. Tactical drones.
- ii. Explosive trace detectors.

## **COUNTER IED AND EOD OPERATIONS**

10. The NP Bomb Disposal Unit (BDU) is tasked with the responsibility of carrying out routine Public Safety Bomb Disposal (PSBD) functions in Nigeria. However, the NA also assists in the performance of this function when the need arises. Owing to the threats posed by IEDs and unexploded ordnances, it would be important to know the indicators of their presence and identifications as well.

11. **Indicators of Explosion**. There are a number of indicators to explosion. Some of these are:

- a. Formation of crater.
- b. Presence of bomb crater and splinters.
- c. Widespread breakage of windows in the area.
- d. Evidence of earth shock, collapse of walls and chimneys.
- e. Blackening of the earth.
- f. Smoke especially gases by day and flash by night.

12. **Indicators of the Presence of Unexploded Bombs**. Certain indicators point/confirm the presence of Unexploded Bombs (UXB). These indicators are as follows:

- a. Presence of part or whole bomb.
- b. Entry hole.
- c. Splash crater.
- d. Damage after an air raid where there is no evidence of explosion.
- e. Ricochet.
- f. Piece of bomb casing.

13. **Identification of UXB.** UXB can be identified as follows:

- a. Tail unit/Retarded ring.
- b. Carrying bands/lugs.
- c. Assemblies like booster and igniter.
- d. Markings on the body.
- e. On explosion, fragments can indicate thickness of casing and type of bomb.

### **SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS**

1. State the relevant points an outline plan for IS operation should cover.
2. You are the Commander of A Coy which has been earmarked for IS operation.
  - a. What essential stores and equipment will you require to carry out your task?
  - b. What aspects of training do you see your men carrying out prior to the call out?
  - c. What other preparations will you undertake?
3. What are the factors and guiding rules that will influence modification to the normal pattern of training for IS Operations?
4. Which items of information will you like to know about the potential enemy and what are the sources of such information?

## **CHAPTER 8**

# **COMMAND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS**

## **INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE**

1. The importance of command, control and good communication during IS operations cannot be over-emphasised. Therefore, it is important to organize the various elements in an IS operation in a manner that every stakeholder is in no doubt regarding the exercise of command and the channels through which information can be disseminated. This will ensure synergy and easy flow of information to respond to developing situations.

2. The objective of this chapter is to provide the student an understanding of the organizational set up and composition of the command control and communication mechanisms from the highest to the lowest levels during IS operations.

## **COMMAND OF OPERATIONS**

3. The need for command and control in any operation and especially in IS operations means that control has to be established at the highest level in accordance with a formulated national plan. The implementation of the formulated policy is carried out in a properly coordinated fashion at the lower levels.

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4. The coordination of all civil and military security forces within the framework of the plan is the chief ingredient for success. Appropriate chain of command and the state and local government operating committees are vital for a good control mechanism.

5. **Chain of Command.** Every function of government is normally affected by an emergency. It is therefore necessary to develop a special system for controlling and directing operations in the event of such an emergency. Since countries and situations differ from one another, no standard organization can be said to be suitable for all situations. Whatever organization is agreed upon will be affected by the following:

- a. The type of constitution of the country.
- b. The size, composition and effectiveness of the security forces.
- c. Extent of the insurgency.
- d. Personalities of the leaders.
- e. Structure of government.

6. **State Operations Committee.** The state operations committee comprises the following:

- a. State Governor.
- b. Brigade Commander or Battalion Commander in States without Bde HQ.
- c. Commissioner of Police.
- d. Director DSS.
- e. Any other Co-opted Member.



7. **Local Government Operations Committee.** The local government operations committee comprises the following:

- a. Chairman or Administrator of local Government.
- b. Battalion Commander.
- c. Divisional Police Officer.
- d. OC State Security.

## **CONTROL OF OPERATION**

8. The function of the committee system is essentially the provision of a forum for planning and coordination. Appropriate military and police commanders still retain their command function. There is however the need for interaction between the civil police and their military counterparts before operations which vary from previously agreed policy plans are undertaken. Control is achieved through the proper siting and location of headquarters and joint secretariats.

9. **Headquarters.** Joint Operations Room at each level of command should be sited at a police or civil administrative headquarters. Appropriate military headquarters must be set up adjacent to it or close by. Distance notwithstanding, an effective and secure communication system must be established between them.

10. **Joint Secretariats.** For the smooth functioning of the central control of operations, joint secretariats must be established. This will enable the swift implementation of joint decisions without compromise, and to reduce lapses in security to a minimum.

## **COMMUNICATIONS**

11. An indispensable aspect of IS operation is the effective communication necessary to ensure timely intervention and monitoring of a crisis situation. Good command and control can only be assured if communication between all the units and other security agencies involved in suppressing disturbances, flow unhindered.

12. **Channel of Communication.** In the NA, the vertical channel of communication between the units and formation remains unchanged. Directives to deploy troops will always emanate from Army Headquarters to the tasked formation. At the operational level, while the Battalion commander takes charge of the crisis, the higher formations monitor the development and progress of the situation. This channel of communication goes side by side with a horizontal contact with other security agencies participating in IS operation. Apart from establishing a field HQ, the local commander should also maintain frequent contact with the local police headquarters with which he could be on a separate radio net. In a crisis situation, the local commander should have a list of important telephone numbers and be able to communicate with the following:

- a. Formation HQ.
- b. Joint Operations Room.
- c. Company HQ.
- d. Control Points.
- e. Patrols.
- f. Flanking Units.

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13. **Means of Communication.** All or some of the means of communication mentioned below will be essential to the success of an IS operation:

- a. Radio
  - (1) Fitted on vehicle.
  - (2) Man packed.
- b. Walkie-Talkie.
- c. Runner.
- d. Despatch Rider.
- e. Ground/Air Communications.
- f. GSM.
- g. Satellite.

14. **Joint Communication.** A joint communication system is necessary to ensure that formations, units, the police and civil authorities can be in touch.

15. **Liaison.** Close liaison between the military, police and civil authorities must be maintained at all levels. Efficient system of passing signal traffic between the army and police radio stations must be worked out. This responsibility lies on the senior signal officer and telecommunication official of all concerned. The army should offer its facilities for carriage of important civil postal services.

16. **Security of Communication.** The following aspects of security are important:

- a. Adherence at all times to the rules of voice procedure including use of appointment titles because the enemy is capable of monitoring voice codes.
- b. Telephone system with radio relay back -up and with channels allotted to tele-printers offer some

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security.

c. Exchanges must be made inaccessible to saboteurs and Ciphers can be used where necessary to enhance security.

d. Senior signal officers shall be involved in the tapping of telephones to obtain information about the enemy.

17. **Reporting.** Every event and action that takes place during an IS operation must be recorded in details in the Log Sheets or diaries. It is necessary that every group taking part in separate operation should maintain its diary. A collation of all the events will give a clearer picture of activities that took place. At designated timings, regular SITREPs must be sent and filed to catalogue the sequence and development of events as they occur.

### **SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS**

1. Outline the organization and composition of the chain of command at State and LGA levels.
2. How do you see command and control being exercised during an IS operation.
3. What communication means are available to you during an IS operation.
4. What precautionary measures will you take to ensure security at all times?

## **CHAPTER 9**

# **INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION IN INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS**

## **INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE**

1. Intelligence has continued to be a major factor in dealing with IS situations. Bearing this in mind, actors during IS operations are expected to maintain an intelligence network that allows for unhindered circulation of accurate and reliable intelligence. The successful accomplishment of a civil disturbance control mission will also depend on the quality and timeliness of intelligence.
2. The objective of this chapter is to explain intelligence organisation and methods of operation of government and military intelligence agencies. It will also enumerate measures to ensure security of operation.

## **INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION**

3. Intelligence organisation play a key role during IS operations. The intelligence officer is responsible for the production of intelligence but the collection effort has to be coordinated and continuous from every stakeholder. Co-location of command posts and the establishment of joint operations centres facilitate the collection and exchange of information.

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4. Rapid dissemination of this information is essential to enable quick and effective response by the executing units. Every intelligence organisation must be able to exploit all sources of information organic to it and at the same time be able to handle, process and disseminate intelligence. It should also have a national as well as military structure, centrally controlled either by a director or a senior intelligence officer in the area of operations. Ideally all intelligence agencies should be integrated in one organisation which operates on the committee system.

### **THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM**

5. Intelligence committee is set up at the highest national level, chaired by a director of intelligence with representatives from government departments and the security forces as members. Similar committees are formed at the state and local government levels.

6. **Composition.** Each committee should include a representative from:
- a. The civil administration.
  - b. Uniform police.
  - c. DSS.
  - d. Intelligence and security staff from the equivalent army formation or unit.
  - e. Intelligence Officers or representatives from sub-units or unit detachments at lower levels.

7. **Levels of Intelligence Organisation:**

a. **Joint Committee**. The joint committee is comprised as follows:

- (1) Military Intelligence Officer.
- (2) Police representative.
- (3) DSS representative.
- (4) Civilian representative.

b. **State Security Committee**. The state security committee is comprised as follows:

- (1) Governor.
- (2) Brigade Commander.
- (3) Assistant Director DSS.
- (4) Police Commissioner.

c. **Joint Intelligence Committee (Local Government Level):**

- (1) The Local Government Chairman.
- (2) Commanding Officer or Officer Commanding.
- (3) Divisional Police Officer.
- (4) DSS representative at LGA.

8. **Function of an Intelligence Committee**. The functions of an Intelligence Committee are:

- a. At national level, to keep government informed on all aspects of intelligence and security.
- b. At lower level, to keep the next higher committee informed on all aspects of intelligence and security in its

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area of responsibility.

c. To provide the intelligence on which operational planning can be based and protective measures to be adopted.

d. To allocate tasks, targets and priorities to the intelligence organisation.

## **INTELLIGENCE PLANNING**

9. **Planning.** Planning involves the following activities:

a. Identify agencies and sources of information available in each of the potential Flash Points and charge them to generate periodic reports to update intelligence concerning the area.

b. Immediately on arrival in the area, contact these agencies and sources for latest information.

c. Maps of the area should be stocked and plans should cover aerial reconnaissance and air-photo missions to verify map accuracy and to obtain updated information as required during operations.

10. **General Rules for Security.** The following 5 general rules must be observed:

a. Current military security intelligence must be applied sensibly in relation to the resources available.

b. The importance of Counter Intelligence (CI) and security should be brought home to commanders at all levels.

c. All CI and security activities must be controlled by a central authority.

d. Distribution of information must be on a need to know basis.

e. Communications security must be given special



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and constant attention.

11. **Measures to Ensure Security of Operations.** The following measures are to be adopted:

- a. Careless talk in all places must be avoided.
- b. "Need to Know" list should be the main aim so that only a few officers are involved in pre-planning operations and that distribution list can be kept small.
- c. Officers should be told only that part of the plan that is essential for them to know.
- d. Orders groups should be kept as small as possible, and held in inconspicuous localities. Those attending should be in civil clothes.
- e. Unit should be pre-stocked with reserves.
- f. Every operation should have a well thought out cover plan.
- g. Communication security must and should be enforced.
- h. Centralized control of CI and security activities must be maintained.

## **SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS**

1. What are the functions of intelligence committee?
2. Enumerate the critical items of information and sources from where such information can be obtained.
3. What are the general rules for security?
4. What measures will you take to ensure security of operations.

## **CHAPTER 10**

# **COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE AND COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS**

### **INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES**

1. Revolutions and insurgencies are serious internal security situations that demand the intervention of security forces. The military roles that cover primarily the maintenance and restoration of public order in these situations are referred to as Counter Revolutionary or Counter Insurgency(COIN) Operations.
2. The objective of this chapter is to provide the student an understanding of revolutionary and insurgency activities and the conduct of counter revolutionary operations in aid of civil authority whether they are concerned with civil disturbances, rebellion or insurgencies.

### **REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE**

3. **Phases of Revolution.** The phases of a revolutionary war are commonly classified into 4 going by the Maoist theory of war. These phases may be experienced at different times in different parts of the same country but the essential point to grasp is that the insurgent must pursue 2 complementary aims- to gain the support of a significant proportion of the people, and to harass the government to a point where it loses the will to fight, or over reacts. The phases are:

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- a. Preparatory.
- b. Active resistance.
- c. Insurgency.
- d. Open offensive.

4. **Revolutionary Tactics.** Revolutionary tactics take the following forms:

- a. Disrupting industry and public service by strikes and sabotage.
- b. Widespread disturbances to stretch security forces.
- c. Creating incidents to lure security forces into a trap.
- d. Provoking security - forces to over react.
- e. Hostile propaganda.
- f. Fomenting inter factional strife.
- g. Attacking buildings with rockets and mortars.
- h. Sniping at roadblocks, static post and sentries.
- i. Ambushes and engagement of helipads.

## **COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE**

5. **Principles.** There are 3 principles of CRW:

- a. **Minimum Necessary Force.** A Comd must never use more force than is necessary to achieve his immediate military aim.
- b. **Political Awareness.** All servicemen must be aware of the political aims of the government in the areas of operations and of the measures devised to implement them. All ranks must be properly and comprehensively briefed on the background to operations.

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c. **Popular Support.** This is a pre-requisite to democracy and a vital ingredient for the success of CRW. However, much depends on government policy and the way troops discharge these tasks. Effort must be made to acquire popular support and confidence.

6. **Deployments.** There are 2 alternative deployments in CRW:

a. **Bases Outside the Area.** A secured base can be set up where men off duty can relax and possibly enjoy some facilities. Less defenses and sentries will be required for protection. It is accessible to administrative troops and so resupply and repairs could easily be undertaken. The disadvantage is that greater reaction time is required and reserves have to be kept at short notice. The move of tps and vehs require escorts and provides easy targets. The journey time eats into personal administration.

b. **Bases in the Areas:**

(1) **Advantages.**

(a) Speedy action.

(b) Troops become more closely identified with the area and can dominate it easily.

(2) **Disadvantages.**

(a) Troops rest but don't relax.

(b) Constant exposure to danger of attack.

(c) Strain on manpower due to incessant escort duties.

## **TYPES OF COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS**

7. **Rural Operations.** There are 2 broad scales of rural operations:

a. **Minor Operations.** Minor operations are those where the right of the elected government still runs which requires a relatively minor operation to be mounted to regain control and eliminate the threat. This involves small bodies of troops though larger numbers can be employed if the area is large. The techniques applicable to rural settings are:

- (1) Protection of personnel and guarding of installations.
- (2) Protection of convoys and route piquetting.
- (3) Control of movement.
- (4) Cordon and search.
- (5) Patrols, Ambushes etc.

b. **Operation to Regain Control of an Area.**

These are areas where government authority has been so eroded that government officials are no longer free to perform duties. This calls for a wider scale of operations with measures similar to those employed in limited war. It also calls for wider measures and the deployment of large units to conduct operations to reintroduce government control. This requires the techniques for a minor rural operation and in addition is influenced by:

- (1) Strength and organisation of the revolutionary movement.

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- (2) Support accorded the movement.
- (3) Nature of countryside, accessibility and density of the population.
- (4) Forces available.

8. **Urban Operations.** Urban operations is usually conducted to overcome the techniques of the urban guerilla that makes use of the cover provided by the population and of the many escape routes available to him. This calls for additional caution and constant alertness on the part of a soldier operating in urban area because he presents an easy target. Efforts are therefore required to ensure that the following actions are taken:

- a. A soldier in static posts must be covered by fire.
- b. Post to be properly protected.
- c. All moves to be covered by fire support.
- d. Avoid discussing military matters with local acquaintance especially girls.

## **OPERATIONAL CONCEPT**

9. The general concept of operation in Counter Revolutionary Operation (CRO) is to separate the revolutionary element from the population. This will involve maintenance of attention on the movement and the protection of the population by denying terrorists a free run anywhere in the operation area.

10. **Firm Base.** All operations must be mounted from a firm base which should be:

- a. The site of local civil administration.
- b. Accessible by land over routes which can be secured without too much effort.

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- c. Able to provide at least helipad if not a tactical (Support Reconnaissance) airstrip.
- d. Easily defensible with minimum force.
- e. Large enough to accommodate the necessary logistic support and troops.
- f. Located at the edge of an already controlled area so that the rear is secure.

11. **Sequence of Build Up in a Firm Base.** The sequence of buildup of a firm base takes weeks depending on the distribution involved and resources available. The normal sequence might be:

- a. An air assault by airborne troops, or an infantry battalion group.
- b. Assumption of overall control of the defence by the assault battalion group.
- c. A key plan which directs the deployment of units and installations to selected areas.
- d. Reception arrangements by the assault battalion group for the follow-up echelons.
- e. Offensive patrolling by the assault battalion in the area close to the base.
- f. Hand over of sectors of the perimeter to follow up battalion groups.
- g. Frequent clearance searches of the base adjacent country.
- h. Reception of a onetime road convoy.
- i. Follow-up battalion's patrols effectively in their Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR).
- j. Opening of an airstrip.
- k. Defence and provision of Counter-Attack force by assault battalion.

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- l. Establishment of a limited controlled area.
- m. Introduction of local military and para-military forces for assault in the defence of the base and patrolling etc.
- n. Operations in-depth to start concurrently with the establishment of the controlled area.

### **INSURGENT STRATEGIES**

12. More often than not, insurgent leaders are well informed, astute and will probably study the lessons of previous campaigns of insurgency. The most popular insurgent strategies continue to provide inspiration and guidance for diverse groups around the world. The strategy adopted would however always depend on the prevailing environment. The 4 broad insurgent strategies are summarised as follows

13. **Conspiratorial Strategy**. This strategy was designed to operate in an urban environment, ideally the capital city, which is seen as the decisive arena. Small cells of potential leaders attempt to release and channel the energy of a disaffected society, generating spontaneous uprising by means of bold armed action. Typically, key points will be seized and a decapitating strike made against the governing regime. Modern exponents will seek both to seize control of and exploit media coverage. The insurgent has to be highly secretive, disciplined, and capable of quick assembly or dispersion.

14. **Protracted Popular War Strategy**. The protracted war strategy was designed by Mao and envisaged 3 phases; strategic defensive (organization), strategic equilibrium (Guerilla Warfare) and strategic offensive (open battle),



leading to seizure of political power. Although often linked with a Marxist ideology, the strategy is based on the assumption that the cause will attract ever increasing number of supporters. The strategy is mostly applicable in rural, peasant-based environments where government control is weak or non-existent. It will involve a mix of political activities, terrorism and guerrilla tactics, but with the former always predominant.

15. **Urban Insurgency Strategy.** The urban insurgency strategy involves the application of organized crime and terrorism in a systematic and ruthless manner. The intention, is to force a repressive military response that in turn will alienate the volatile mass of the urban poor and move them to revolt. The media will be used to generate an air of panic. The urban insurgency also usually adopts tactics designed to erode the morale of the politicians, the administrators and the judiciary, the police and the army, with the aim of inducing a climate of collapse. The main weapon of the urban insurgent is indiscriminate terror, by which he can induce the situation of general insecurity, nervousness and fear.

16. **Isolated Terrorism Strategy.** Isolated terrorism strategy is one in which small groups who hold extremist views can conduct isolated acts of terrorism or assassination in the hope that their demands can be met. It exploits the vulnerability, complexity and high technological advances in the modern society such as fast trains, jet aircrafts and crowded motor ways to make extravagant demands linked to the threat of causing spectacular disasters. With the sort of publicity which modern communication has made inevitable, one such act of terrorism can make an impact on the world at

large. This may not amount to full scale insurrection or indeed anything approaching it, but it could easily result in the government becoming involved in large scale Counter-Terrorism operations to find and neutralize the group or face the embarrassing consequences.

## **INSURGENT MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS**

17. **The Cell System**. An insurgency is often split into cells, each with a leader with a few members of them between 3 and 5. These members know only each other and their own leader, while the leader knows only one person outside the cell, who in turn knows only one member of the district or regional organization and so on, up the scale. There is virtually no lateral communication in the organization.

18. **Satellite Phones**.

19. **Mobile Phones**.

19. **Television**. Televisions are used directly to promote their cause or indirectly by means of ensuring that incidents are newsworthy enough to ensure that they are reported on television. The distribution of video tapes can also enormously enhance an insurgent's cause, particularly when television channels are closely controlled or even censored.

20. **Internet**. Modern insurgent groups make extensive use of cyberspace (internet) as an efficient and relatively secure method of communication. The internet is also used as part of their information operations.

**COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS**

21. A state of insurgency implies that the insurgents have control of a sizeable area of the country and that it will almost inevitably be part of a revolutionary war. Counter Insurgency is conducted in areas where the military is directly responsible for law and order or where it has been asked for help. It covers the full range of measures which must be taken by the government and security forces to defeat the insurgents and restore government authority. When acts of terrorism including arson, looting, abduction, murders and bombings take place and conditions under which guerrilla movements thrive exist, the NA and other security forces should be gearing up for counter-terrorism and counter insurgency operations simultaneously.

22. **Principles of Counter Insurgency**. The declaration of a state of emergency is a signal that troops may be engaged in minor and large scale military operations. For IS value, it is essential to understand the basic principles of counter insurgency as follows:

- a. Clear political aim.
- b. Primacy of law.
- c. Need for overall plan.
- d. Defeating subversion.
- e. Security of base area.

22. **Pre-requisites for Counter –Insurgency Operations**. The pre-requisites for counter insurgency operations are:

- a. Complete cooperation between the different departments of government.

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- b. Civic action programmes.
- c. Psychological operations.
- d. Sound intelligence network.
- e. Destruction or capture of hard core insurgents.

### **MILITARY ASPECTS OF COUNTER INSURGENCY**

23. **Offensive Action**. Small scale offensive operations will be necessary to isolate the adversaries from the civil population and exert constant pressure on the former. However, large scale operations should be undertaken under the following circumstances:

- a. Only based on sound intelligence.
- b. When success will provide worthwhile and lasting results.
- c. When it is desired to seize and hold hostile controlled areas.

24. **Fighting the Insurgents in their Own Environment**. The army is normally trained in conventional warfare and hence the troops which are inducted for COIN operations need to re-train in the environment of the insurgents and tactics. Troops must learn to live off the land, move quickly in difficult terrain, live on restricted food and most importantly be lightly equipped and armed to be able to shoot quickly. The tendency to carry a lot of rations and ammunition and sometimes even heavy weapons such as 81 mm mortar must be curbed.

25. **Deployment of Troops**. It will be better to saturate a given area with a large number of small sized groups to gain larger number of contacts. Large fire-fights, employing heavy weapons and aircrafts in the populated areas should be avoided

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as they are liable to create more insurgents than are killed, making the task of all government agencies difficult.

26. **Patrolling.** The insurgents seldom hold ground as in conventional warfare. Large size patrols are not necessarily more secure. They are difficult to conceal and more vulnerable to ambush, especially at night. The fire power of a small party armed with automatic weapons is such that it can easily take on a large insurgent force, inflict heavy losses and get away. The requirements are superior training and skill as well as retention of initiative. In addition, ample time should be allowed for movement and carrying out of task at the planning stage to avoid rush for time during halts and movement off known tracks. The staff who plan patrols are required to go out on some patrols to have a firsthand experience of time and space as well as other problems of patrolling. Issues concerning patrol task table must be taken seriously especially in rural areas to forestall fratricide.

27. **Ambush.** The insurgents are just as vulnerable to ambushes as the security forces. The insurgent also carry out fairly large scale movement of forces, supplies, agents, couriers. If the intelligence efforts are directed against these possible targets can be selected, which will provide excellent opportunities for ambushes thereby denying freedom of movement to the insurgents. It is not the strength but the training and leadership, as well as sound intelligence which are important if these ambushes are to succeed. Counter ambush operations also demand high fighting spirit and battle skill. The only chance of survival once caught in an ambush lies in immediate and coordinated offensive action.

28. **Search and Destroy Operations.** Search and destroy operations basically involve raids parties. The operations

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require time especially the movement through rough country. About 3 to 5 days may be spent in a particular area most of it during the search phase. Similarly, attempts to carry out such operations without sound intelligence will be wasteful in efforts and will be frustrating for troops. It will therefore be better to concentrate on small scale operations and on collection of intelligence. Most intelligence provided by the police and other security agencies may not be accurate for raids as the insurgents shift their hide-outs and camps at the slightest suspicion of compromise. Friendly locals should be the main source of information. Aerial reconnaissance should also be done discreetly in order to retain surprise.

29. **Convoy and Road Protection.** The organization of convoys and arrangement for adequate road protection is a staff responsibility. However, the most avoidable casualties are those caused by the insurgents by snipping and ambushing road convoys. All movement of mechanical transport must be regulated by convoys, adequately protected. The road communication should be divided into sectors, each with a controlling headquarters to ensure arrangements are made for timings, composition, command, communication and escort. Formations made responsible for running convoys must produce standing orders for convoys, escorts and road opening posts.

30. **Administration.** The peculiarities of a COIN necessitate modification in the normal administration and organization. The factors that are considered are:

- a. Extended distances between units.
- b. Diversity of operational tasks.
- c. Vulnerability of administrative installations and road communications.

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- d. Requirement to support the population administratively.
- e. Necessity for special security arrangements.
- f. Siting of administrative installations due to threats of raids by the insurgent and requirement for concentration rather than dispersion.
- g. Need for decentralization due to the extensive area of operations and decentralized nature of operation.
- h. Necessity to stock ammunition in company and platoon security posts and attractiveness of ammunition stock as target for the insurgents.
- i. Local purchase of fresh rations.
- j. Use of animal transport and porters including local civilians.
- k. Additional demand on medical resources to provide aids to civilian sick and wounded.

## **SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS**

- 1. What are the 4 phases of a revolution.
- 2. Enumerate the forms of revolutionary tactics.
- 3. State the 3 principles of CRW.
- 4. State the types of CRO.
- 5. What are the common insurgent strategies?
- 6. State the principles of COIN ops.
- 7. State the military aspects of COIN and explain any 2.

## **CHAPTER 11**

### **INTER-AGENCY CO-OPERATIONS**

#### **INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE**

1. The challenges of an IS situation always demand that the military establish good relations with the civil police, civil population and the media. These components to a large extent help to shape the operating environment and the efficiency with which the military converts opportunities into successes.
2. The objective of this chapter is to provide the student an understanding of the collaboration required between the military and police as well as the measures employed to maintain positive control of the media and the civil population in IS situations.

#### **MILITARY/ OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES RELATIONS**

3. In recent time the NA has seen increased involvement with other government agencies in the effort to maintain law and order. This has also increasingly put NA personnel at risk of friction when carrying out military duties in the civil environment. This concern also necessitates more tolerant and professional approach from NA personnel.
4. **Machinery of Cooperation.** Cooperation between the military and other agencies stems from stated government



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policies. The extent of this cooperation both before, during and after the threat will be limited by political considerations and government direction. However, joint action is the key to success. Some of the preparatory arrangements and areas of cooperation include:

- a. Timely exchange of intelligence on the "need to know basis". (Periodic meetings are necessary).
- b. Establishment of a procedure by which the army comes to the "aid of civil power".
- c. Joint CPX, and study days.
- d. Practice turnout covering the establishment of a joint HQ and communications.
- e. Joint practice of riot and crowd dispersal drills.
- f. Preparation of SOPs.
- g. Preparation of "rules of engagement".
- h. Joint road blocks.

5. **Military Assistance to other Agencies of Government.** The NA provides direct assistance to other agencies of government as part of its constitutional engagement relating to military assistance to Ministries, Departments and Agencies. This has often inflamed the ambers of inter-agency rivalry especially with the NP which otherwise should provide opportunities to develop and strengthen rapports. Therefore, every effort should be exploited by commanders to engage positively during these interactions to build bridges of trust and collaboration as this affords the military greater chances of success during IS operations. Some of the areas of military assistance to other agencies include:

- a. Law enforcement.
- b. Anti-Robbery operations.
- c. Anti-Kidnapping operations.

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- d. Anti-Banditry operations.
- e. Anti-Vandalisation and sabotage operations.
- f. Criminal law enforcement in NA barracks and cantonments.
- g. Arms control operations.
- h. Disaster response.
- i. Electoral security.
- j. Training assistance.
- k. Medical assistance.
- l. Anti-smuggling and contraband operations.
- m. Drug law enforcement.
- n. Road safety.
- o. Quality control.
- p. Prisons enforcements.
- q. Research and development.
- r. Bomb disposal.
- s. Immigration and border control.

### **MILITARY/MEDIA RELATIONS**

6. In IS operations the lead agency is usually responsible for dealing with the media. The primary purpose of a journalist is to get a better story than his competitors and to get it in time for the earliest publication. Therefore, attention to the media is necessary to guard against reportage that could be detrimental to the objectives of the military mission.

#### **7. Basic Principles to Apply in dealing with the Media.**

- a. No unnecessary hindrance is to be offered to a journalist's freedom to operate.
- b. A member of the media has the same rights,

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obligation and liberty as any other citizens.

c. Any entry to Army premises and any contact with army personnel should be in accordance with the prevailing instructions issued by the appropriate formation HQ.

8. **Publicity.** Media operation staff approval is required before any member of the forces agrees to give statement or interview for TV or Radio. Whenever possible, the best spokesman, irrespective of rank should be used particularly if he can speak with firsthand knowledge of the subject in question.

9. **Responsibility of the Ordinary Soldier.** Soldiers must understand that what they say can instantly be broadcasted to fellow soldiers, Nigerians, allies, world audience and potential adversaries. Therefore, as part of operations directives, orders or instructions, all soldiers must be made to understand their responsibilities and to know that they are not to talk to the media without permission from their commander.

10. **Responsibilities of the Military.** The responsibilities of the military in a crisis situation are as mentioned below:

- a. The media should be carried along at all stages of operation.
- b. The NA PRO should appeal to the patriotic instinct of journalists in order to be reasonable, cautious and circumstantial in their coverage.
- c. Journalists should be informed on the Rules of Engagement.
- d. There should be regular briefing on the crisis situation at the operations' headquarters.

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- e. Photo journalists may be restricted from taking photographs depending on the situation on the ground.
- f. The Press should be discouraged from writing articles or reports that would discourage, demoralize or defame the troops.
- g. Journalists should be made to understand that certain aspects of the operations are classified and may fall under the Official Secret Acts which cannot be published.
- h. All journalists within the area of military operations during any crisis are subject to the army commander on ground through his PRO.

11. **Responsibilities of the Media.** The responsibilities of the media in a crisis situation are as mentioned below:

- a. Media reports should be factual and devoid of inflammatory, mischievous, seditious, rebellious and inciting comments.
- b. The media should assist in promoting the unity and stability of the nation by publishing or broadcasting those matters that are true and verified.
- c. The media should inform the field commander if direct transmission equipment is being used in the crisis area.

## **CIVIL/MILITARY COOPERATION**

12. The ranges of activities that are conducted in the area of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) serve the purpose to establish and maintain full cooperation between the military and the civil authorities, organizations, agencies and the populace in the short term. It also assists create and sustain

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conditions favourable to the general populace without jeopardizing the desired end-state in the long term.

13. **Core Functions.** CIMIC revolves around 4 core functions. The core functions are:

a. **Liaison between Military and Civil Agencies.**

A pre-condition for a successful CIMIC is to ensure liaison at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The main purpose of military liaison is to provide the coordination necessary to assist in the planning of military mission. It also provide fundamental input to the military estimate and entire planning process.

b. **Public Information Policy.** Public information policy is required to ensure the dissemination of information on all activities and achievements that help to advance the overall objectives. The policy also aids the general public to participate actively in public oriented programmes.

c. **Support to the Force.** Non-combatant support to an operating force that would emanate from government agencies is one of the central objectives of CIMIC. During operations, there may be the need to use resources, supplies, infrastructure and expertise of local communities and/ or international agencies to support military missions as it affects the population.

d. **Support to the Civil Environment.** This involve all CIMIC activities supported by military resources where and when required to create the condition necessary for the fulfillment of the military

mission. It can also take place when the appropriate civil authorities and agencies are unable to carry out their natural task.

14. **Principle of Civil Military Cooperation.** Some acclaimed principles guard the establishment of CIMIC during operations. They are:

a. **Communication.** Effective communication with civil authorities, external organizations and the civil population is vital to consent, sustenance, cooperation and fair distribution of activities. This also enhances synergy in the course of executing mutually benefitting programmes.

b. **Transparency.** Differing training, modalities between civil and military institutions lead to confusion and misunderstanding especially when aggravated by inaccurate media report, political bias and poor communication. This underscores the need for transparency by stakeholders.

c. **Mutual Responsibility.** The analysis and understanding of shared common goals will lead to agreed sharing of responsibilities. This helps to establish and maintain durable and mutually beneficial relationships.

d. **Co-operation.** CIMIC relies on cooperation between various organs operating in a common environment. Therefore, from the onset, it is necessary to identify areas of common interest that would

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stimulate co-operation and eventually drive other parameters. The common goals should be identified, acknowledged and recognized in the course of providing respective services.

e. **Common Goals.** This relates to the basis of CIMIC where commitments are made in anticipation of achieving objectives and not necessarily in meeting deadlines. This also entails understanding the political dimension and resource commitments required for a common goal.

f. **Differential Relationship.** Differing relationship between the military and other respective civil actors may be misunderstood. Therefore, occasions and activities that call for differing relations need to be handled with caution. Coordination through an established administrative body serves to dispel any possible grievances.

g. **Understanding, Respect and Trust.** Understanding associated details about key civil actors enable commanders to determine, within the civil-military dimension, what can and cannot be achieved, what will and will not be undertaken by operating agencies and legal circumstances within which operations are to be conducted.

h. **Cultural Awareness**. This entails conscious sensitivity towards local customs, way of life, religion and ethnic divergence of an operating environment. In politically sensitive environments, inadvertent violations could undermine the chances of success.

i. **Influence**. Maintaining a positive image through winning hearts and minds of the citizens in the target environment is an important attribute in CIMIC. It is therefore necessary to engage in the local affairs and activities in the target environment to meet immediate needs that will stimulate hope for future support and thus retain positive influence over the citizens.

15. **Community Relations Projects**. Community relation's projects (winning the hearts and minds) are defined, as activities aimed at improving the relationship between the armed forces and the local population in order to create attitudes favourable to the achievement of political and military objectives. Proposed community relations projects should be examined against the following criteria:

- a. Provide the maximum opportunity for the Services to participate.
- b. Be directed to all sections of the community and to cover as many communities as possible.
- c. Meet a genuine need.
- d. Be jointly planned with the local authority.



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- e. Be within the ability of those concerned to complete within a reasonable time.
- f. But not taking employment away from civilians.

### **SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS**

- 1. In what areas do you see the police and the military cooperating during preparation for IS operations.
- 2. What are the responsibilities of the military in IS situation
- 3. What are the responsibilities of the media in IS situation.
- 4. Explain the 4 core functions of CIMIC.
- 5. State the principles of CIMIC.
- 6. What are the criteria for community relation projects.

## **CHAPTER 12**

# **PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND PROPAGANDA**

### **INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES**

1. It has always been important to attack the will rather than the capabilities of an adversary to commence or continue actions inimical to peace and security. This reason makes the employment of psychological operations a major part in conflict resolution and IS operations.
2. The objective of this chapter is to provide the student an understanding of how psychological operations can be used in support of military actions in IS situations.

### **PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS**

3. **Aims.** Psychological operations are designed to complement other military actions geared towards achieving military and national objectives. Psychological operations have 2 distinct military aims:
  - a. Gaining the confidence and cooperation of the civil population (i.e consolidation) as to assist military operation by isolating the insurgents from civil support and ensuring steady flow of information.
  - b. Lowering the morale of the insurgents and thereby encouraging surrender and defection.

4. **Pre-requisite for Psychological Operations.** To be successful propaganda must be:
- Based on truth.
  - Be in conformity with government policy.
  - Based on accurate knowledge of the target.
  - Carefully planned on a joint military/civil basis.
  - Put over by the best media available.
  - Attributable to the government rather than the military.
  - Based on positive approach to create trust and confidence that will make the insurgents to surrender without fear of reappraisals.

5. **Conduct.** In order to achieve the 2 aims set out above, psychological operations should be directed at the specific tasks given below:

- Consolidation Tasks:**
  - Encouraging loyal elements to remain loyal and to denounce insurgents.
  - Publicizing military successes, insurgents losses and government measures to improve peoples' well-being. This will coerce the uncommitted to support the government.
  - Good community relations to win the hearts and the minds of the populace.
  - Demonstrating the strength and efficiency of the security forces so as to breed confidence in the government ability to provide security from terrorism.
  - Explaining the need for the imposed restrictions.
  - Forestalling insurgent propaganda from all

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sources.

(7) Explaining to the troops the reason “why” they are involved in the operation.

b. **Anti-Insurgent Tasks:**

(1) Stirring up desertion among the rank and file of the insurgents.

(2) Stressing insurgent losses as against the might of security forces.

(3) Stressing shortage of the insurgents’ combat supplies.

(4) Encouraging surrender and defection by publicizing surrender methods, use of safe conduct passes and its advantages eg. good treatment and leniency.

(5) Publish photographs of deserters.

## **PROPAGANDA**

6. **Requirements for Effective Propaganda.** To be successful, propaganda must fulfill certain conditions which include:

a. **Gain Attention.** Message must be well designed and delivered.

b. **Be Understood.** The target audience must understand message.

c. **Arouse a Need.** Propaganda must arouse a needed attention that the receiver can satisfy by action which will support the Psychological Operations objectives.

d. **Suggest a Solution.** Propaganda must offer a solution to meet the aroused audience.

7. **Propaganda Methods.** Propaganda can be mounted by any of the following methods:

a. **The Written Word.**

- (1) Leaflets.
- (2) Posters.
- (3) Pictures.
- (4) Pamphlets.
- (5) Books.
- (6) Government Newspaper media.

b. **The Spoken Word.**

- (1) Radio broadcasts.
- (2) Ground loudspeakers.
- (3) Voice aircraft.
- (4) Surrendered personal teams.
- (5) Discussion groups.
- (6) Public address systems.
- (7) Rumours.
- (8) Films and television.

c. **Good Deeds.** Well planned community relations.

## **SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS**

1. What do you understand by psychological operation and what are its aims.
2. State 8 pre-requisite for psychological operations.
3. Discuss the conduct of Psychological Operation.
4. State 4 basic requirements of effective propaganda.
5. Enumerate the methods available to you to mount an effective propaganda.

## **CHAPTER 13**

### **PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

#### **INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES**

1. Peace Support Operation (PSO) has been described as a third party approach to conflict resolution. This type of operation is usually carried out after a detailed consultation with the warring parties and mutual agreement to a cease- fire. It is different from peace enforcement, which usually aims at forcing the belligerents to accept terms stipulated by the United Nations or the international community when all efforts at reaching an agreement for a cease-fire have failed.
2. The objective of this chapter is to provide students an understanding of the requirement for preparation, training and conduct of troops before and during the duration of stay in a PSO environment.

#### **CONCEPTS**

3. The scope of modern PSO has expanded in dimension and intensity to necessitate the development of new concepts and strategies for dealing with unfolding challenges. Seven concepts form the basis of contemporary PSO. These are:
  - a. **Preventive Diplomacy.** Preventive Diplomacy refers to all action taken to prevent disputes from developing between parties or preventing exiting

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disputes from escalating into conflicts. It limits the spread of conflict when they occur.

b. **Peace Making**. Peace Making is diplomatic action taken to bring hostile parties into negotiated agreements through such peaceful means as those foreseen under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter (UNC).

c. **Peacekeeping**. Peacekeeping refer to operations generally undertaken under the auspices of UN/AU/ECOWAS and other regional bodies in the field (normally involving military and civilian components), with the consent of the parties to the conflict. It is designed to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fire, separation of forces, etc.) and their resolution. It further allows for the safe delivery of humanitarian aids.

d. **Peace Enforcement**. Peace enforcement may be needed when all other efforts fail. The authority for enforcement is vested on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as enshrined in Chapter VII of the UNC. It allows for the use of armed forces to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations where the UNSC has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.

e. **Peace Building**. Peace building cover all actions in the identification and use of structures, institutions or facilities including support measures to promote peace, build trust and interaction among former parties to the conflict with object of avoiding a relapse into conflict.

f. **Sanctions**. Sanctions cover the application of measures not involving the use of armed force in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. The purpose of sanctions is to modify the behaviour of a party that is threatening international peace and security and not to punish or otherwise exert retribution.

g. **Disarmament**. Disarmament entails the assembly, control and disposal of weapons from parties to a conflict. Micro-disarmament is the practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the UN or regional organization is dealing with relevant to post-conflict peace building.

## **FUNDAMENTALS OF PEACEKEEPING**

4. Peacekeeping is premised on certain fundamentals. These are:

a. **Legitimacy**. A peacekeeping mission derives its legitimacy from its mandate, international support,



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adherence to statutory laws and conventions and the credibility of the forces.

b. **Consent.** UN and regional peacekeeping operations are established with the consent and co-operation of the parties to a conflict. Unlike peacekeeping, peace enforcement may not require the consent of all parties to the conflict.

c. **Impartiality** A peacekeeping force must be impartial in character. The force cannot take sides without becoming party to the conflict it has been mandated to contain and resolve.

d. **Use of Minimum Force.** In peacekeeping operations, force will not be used to carry out the mandate except where absolutely necessary. Even then, only the minimum force required for meeting specific objective is to be applied. However, use of Minimum Force does not exclude self-defence of mission personnel and property. The use of force would be clearly defined in the Rules of Engagement (ROE).

e. **Credibility.** The credibility of peacekeeping operation is the confirmation of its ability to accomplish its mandate. To effectively carry out its mandate and earn the confidence of the parties, a peacekeeping force must be composed of trained personnel who are well equipped and possess high professional standards.

- f. **Negotiation and Mediation**. Negotiation and mediation refer to the dialogue between parties to the conflict and mutual decisions reached under the guidance of a mediating agency. The processes may be cumbersome but have enormous potential to de-escalate a conflict, promote a secure environment and develop peaceful and lasting solutions among warring parties.

### **TYPES OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION**

5. Depending on political, geographical, economic or religious circumstances and considerations, PSO could be inuniciated under the following arrangements:

- a. **Bilateral**. This is between two countries that have a previous mutual defence pact that covers such operations or a direct request of one government to another eg Nigeria's participation in Tanzania in 1964 and Senegals' participation in Gambia in 1981.
- b. **Sub-regional** - eg ECOMOG.
- c. **Regional/Continental** - AU peace missions - NATO peace missions.
- d. **Global** - UN peace missions.

## **COMPOSITION OF PSO**

6. The composition of PSO forces and their tasks depends on the nature and intensity of conflict, the political agreement established between the mediating agency and parties to the conflict. It may involve considerations concerning the following subjects:

a. **Diplomatic/Political Officers and Staff.**

Diplomatic/political officers and staff are saddled with tasks ranging from political negotiation to supervising, monitoring and direct control of administrative bodies and offices.

b. **Human Rights Component.** The human rights component undertakes human rights activities such as monitoring the observance of human rights, fundamental freedoms and violations, the prevention of human rights abuses as well as the development and implementation of human rights education programmes.

c. **Civil Administration Component.** The civil administration component monitors, supervises or has direct control of foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information.

d. **Electoral Component.** The electoral component undertakes such tasks as organisation and supervision of free and fair elections or referendums.

- e. **Repatriation Component.** Repatriation component takes care of refugees, Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs), political prisoners and other detainees. The component organizes resettlement processes. This may also involve rehabilitation covering the immediate needs and laying the groundwork for future plans.
- f. **CIVPOL Component.** The Civil Police(CIVPOL) component undertakes the training, supervision and/or control of local civil police in order to maintain law and order effectively and impartially. They take interest in respect for fundamental human rights in PSO environment.
- g. **Border Monitors.** Border monitors are to monitor embargo imposed and report violations along international borders or any other local area in case of intra-state conflict. International staff and field service components are the administrative, financial, communications, logistics and security backbone of any field operations. They usually fall under the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO).
- h. **Military Component.** The tasks of the military component can generally be summarized as the separation of warring parties, establishment of a buffer zone or its equivalent, supervision of truce or cease-fire agreement and prevention of armed conflict between or within nations. In addition, military components

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contribute to the maintenance of law and order and the eventual return to normalcy.

### **PREPARATION FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION**

7. Preparations for PSO takes place concurrently at different levels of the military command once a country is intimated to mobilize troops for mission. These levels and their respective activities include

8. **Action by Higher HQ:**

- a. Early warning to units earmarked for the operation.
- b. Designates training area for the units.
- c. Provision of detailed up-to-date information.
- d. Provision of equipment.
  - (1) Personal weapons.
  - (2) Mine detectors.
  - (3) Night Vision Aids.
  - (4) Sp Wpns.
  - (5) LLAD.
  - (6) Vehs (A&B, Comd Vehs, Amb, Sig FFR etc).
- e. Funds.
- f. Logistics.

9. **Action by Units:**

a. **Training.** The main preoccupation of a unit earmarked for peace-keeping operation is training. The training must be comprehensive and should include:

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- (1) Geo-politics of the area of conflicts.
- (2) Studying the contents of the SOFA.
- (3) Language and culture of the people.
- (4) Computer literacy.
- (5) Emplaning and deplaning drills.
- (6) Comms.
- (7) Driving - This is mandatory for UN Military Observers.
- (8) Map Reading.
- (9) Convoy movement with emphasis on escort duties.
- (10) Roadblock.
- (11) Cordon and Search.
- (12) Ambushes.
- (13) Patrolling (Day and Night).
- (14) First Aid.
- (15) Public relations.
- (16) Wpns skill.
- (17) Physical Trg.

b. **Information.** The CO of a unit earmarked for PSO must be provided with all relevant information, which he, in turn, will disseminate to all troops participating in the operation, irrespective of rank. This should include:

- (1) UN mandate for the operation.
- (2) Background to the crisis.
- (3) Present situation.
- (4) Geography of the region.
- (5) History.
- (6) Government and people of the area, with emphasis on tradition, customs and religion.

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- (7) Information on the Armed Forces; to include size, command structure, equipment and tactics.
- (8) Information on other belligerents to cover identification, Comd structure, leaders, habits etc.
- (9) Terrain and weather.
- (10) Health problem prevalent in the region.
- (11) Profile of the UN Force Commander.
- (12) Other troop contributing countries.
- (13) Status of Forces Agreement.
- (14) Diet and food available in the region.
- (15) Own country's position or interest in the conflict.
- (16) Dos and Don'ts (Especially in UN operations).
- (17) Allowances and other entitlement.

c. **Documentation.** This will include dog tags.

d. **Medical Examinations.** This will include inoculation.

## **MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING**

10. A MOU is like a contract. It contains details of the personnel, major equipment, and self-sustainment services that the contributing country will provide, including the reimbursement rates that will apply, which are clearly laid out in tables of the COE Manual. The UN authorities and the contributing country representatives (including senior logistics personnel) will negotiate a written formal agreement between the UN and the Troops Contributing Countries (TCC) that

clearly establishes the responsibilities and standards for the provision of personnel, major equipment, and self-sustainment support services for both the UN and the contributing country. It will be signed by representatives from Department of Operational Support (DOS) and the contributing country's Permanent Mission to the UN and will remain in force until the end of the mandate of the peacekeeping operation when the formed military returns from the mission area, or until both parties mutually agree that the MOU requires adjustment and/or renegotiation. Therefore, commanders of TCC units must always endeavour to acquaint themselves with the document as it guides on the level of equipment and support available to them.

## **STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT**

11. **Definition.** Taking into consideration the fact that PSO is a third party approach to conflict resolution, a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) could be defined as a legally binding document normally prepared for the regulation of the conduct of all parties involved in a conflict in which foreign troops are brought into another sovereign state to assist in restoration of peace and security. It forms the basis for the type of relationship between the peace-keepers and the warring factions or government of the state and it clearly defines the role, powers, limitations and the level of immunity to be given to the foreign troops.

12. **Origin.** Article 105 of the UN Charter provides that the UN "shall enjoy in the territory of each members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes" and similar privileges for representatives of the UN



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"as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions". The convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 Feb 1964, was the result of the General Assembly's efforts to detail the general protection afforded by Article 105. Whenever it becomes necessary for the UN to deploy forces into a receiving state for an operation, the status of the UN or multinational forces usually depends on the underlying authority upon which the forces are present in the receiving state. If the presence of the UN or multinational forces in the territory of a sovereign state occurs under the coercive authority of the Security Council, then absolute immunity from any receiving state authority exists and may be asserted. However, despite the fact that the Security Council has the authority to specify the status of a force that is deployed under its authority, as well as the status of the members of that force, it has always been desirable to provide for the status of the force by agreement with the receiving state.

13. **Agreements.** Whenever the deployment of UN or multinational forces in a sovereign state becomes necessary, various agreements are entered into. These could basically be grouped into 4 types:

- a. Basic Agreement.
- b. Detailed Status of Forces Agreement.
- c. Agreement for Transit Rights.
- d. Agreement for Permanent Bases.

You are to note that Basic Agreement may not be necessary a written document. It only paves way for further UN actions as it may not be more than mere acceptance of a UN Resolution by the State concerned.

14. **Contents.** A SOFA will contain/include the following:
- a. The International Status of the Forces and its members.
  - b. Entry and departure permits.
  - c. The right to carry arms (incl orders for opening fire).
  - d. Freedom of movement of individual members of the force in host country.
  - e. Use of roads, waterways, port facilities and airfields.
  - f. The right to operate its own communications system incl FM radio stations.
  - g. Postal regulations.
  - h. The flying of UN and national Flags.
  - i. Uniform regulations.
  - j. Permission to operate UN vehicles without special registration.
  - k. Applicability of "The convention of the privileges and immunities of the United Nations".
  - l. Jurisdiction regulations.
  - m. Tax and duty regulations (incl Duty Free Shops and non-dutiable commodities.
  - n. General supply and maintenance matters (Import of equipment, commodities, local procurement of provisions, petrol, oil and lubricants) and custom duties regulations for the UN Forces.
  - o. Compensation regulations (as it affects host country's property).

## **RULES OF ENGAGEMENT**

15. ROE are set of rules established for every PSO, guiding the use of force/weapons and the circumstances for engagement. It is of international concern and is therefore one of the fundamental areas for PSO training. ROE gives all soldiers direction on how they may use their weapons in particular circumstances. It is vital that every soldier knows what law applies in different circumstances. If he does not, then he may break the law through his actions. If he fires his weapon illegally he may be arrested, investigated and charged.

## **AUTHORITY**

16. ROE are issued by national or multinational headquarters, acting as the mediating agency. This is sometimes linked to the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA). Commanders must also be aware of changes and the body authorized to effect such changes. ROE changes from one mission to another.

## **POINTS TO NOTE ON THE APPLICATION OF ROE**

17. ROE defines the degree and manner in which force may be applied and are designed to ensure that the application of force is carefully controlled. When commanders give orders to their subordinates, they must ensure that they are within the ROE. Remember, it is the person that pulls the trigger who is most likely to be guilty of the violation of ROE. Some points to remember:

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- a. ROE do not give exact details on how to deal with every situation, they give guidance only.
- b. ROE are usually written in the form of prohibitions or permissions (CANNOT or CAN).
- c. Where ROE take the form of prohibitions, there lies a set of orders not to take certain actions.
- d. Where ROE are issued as permissions, they are guidance that certain actions may be taken if judged necessary in carrying out assigned tasks.
- e. The use of force must always acknowledge minimum force, evidence, necessity and transparency.

### **CLASSIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT IN UN**

18. UN equipment are classified under major equipment and self-sustainment. The types of equipment in each of the classes include:

- a. **Major Equipment.** Major equipment consists of items directly related to the unit mission as mutually determined by the UN and the troop contributor. Major equipment can be provided by a troop contributor under either a wet lease or a dry lease arrangement.
  - (1) Communications equipment (network).
  - (2) Electrical (generating power for base camps).
  - (3) Engineering, Medical and Dental equipment.

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- (4) Observation equipment (observation posts).
- (5) Accommodation (semi-rigid and or hard structures that can be moved).
- (6) Aircraft.
- (7) Armaments.
- (8) Vehicle.
- (9) Equipment arrangements can be made under Wet lease arrangements and Dry lease arrangements.

b. **Self-Sustainment**. Self-sustainment consistsof equipment and services provided by a troop contributor to support a unit. Self-sustainment is covered in greater detail in chapter 3, Annex B of the 2020 COE Manual A-75-121. Nonetheless, the self- sustainment requirement for a unit include:

- (1) Catering.
- (2) Communications (Telephone, VHF/UHF-FM Comms, etc).
- (3) Offices.
- (4) Electrical (for sub-units).
- (5) Minor Engineering (permanent rigid structure).
- (6) Explosive Ordnance Device (EOD).
- (7) Laundry and Dry-cleaning.
- (8) Tentage.
- (9) Accommodation.
- (10) Medical.
- (11) Observations (Binoculars, etc)

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(12) Nuclear, biological & chemical (NBC) protection.

(13) Field Defence Stores.

(14) Miscellaneous General Stores (Bedding, Furniture, welfare).

(15) Unique Equipment.

### **WET LEASE**

19. A wet lease arrangement is a reimbursement system for Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) whereby the troop contributor assumes responsibility for maintaining and supporting major and minor items of equipment deployed. The troop contributor is entitled to reimbursement for providing this maintenance support.

### **DRY LEASE**

20. A dry lease arrangement is a reimbursement system for COE whereby the troop contributor provides equipment to a peacekeeping mission and the UN either assumes responsibility for maintaining the equipment or arranges with a third party for maintenance of the equipment.

### **RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UN/MISSION LOGISTICS**

21. The responsibilities of the mission logistics are as follows:

- a. Conduct Arrival Inspection of the contingent within one month of arrival.
- b. Conduct Verification Inspections, generally on a quarterly basis.
- c. Conduct Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI)

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once per mandate or at least each six months of service by the contingent in the mission area.

d. Conduct Repatriation Inspections which establish the termination dates for reimbursement payments.

e. Provide support to the contingent in accordance with the UN responsibilities under the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

### **UN INSPECTION**

22. The UN conducts different types of inspections to ensure all equipment in the mission are working and functioning at its optimal levels. The various types of inspections conducted in the mission area are:

a. **Arrival Inspection**. The inspection of major equipment will take place immediately upon arrival in the mission area and must be completed within one month. The UN, in consultation with the troopcontributor, will decide the time and place of such inspection. If equipment and personnel are already in the mission area when the MOU is concluded, the first inspection will be carried out on a date to be jointly determined by the mission and contingent authorities, and is to be completed within one month of that date.

b. **Operational Readiness Inspections**. ORIs must be conducted at least once every six months based on dates to be determined in advance (feasible for all stakeholders). Wherever feasible, the mission is

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requested to consult the contingent or unit when scheduling the ORI and take into account ongoing operations or relocations as ordered by the force Commander (FC).

c. **Repatriation Inspection.** The UN shall carry out an inspection at the time of repatriation of the contingent or component thereof from the mission area. The inspection shall:

- (1) Account for all major equipment of the troop contributor to be repatriated.
- (2) Verify the condition of major equipment provided under the dry lease arrangement to ensure that only equipment of the troop contributor is being repatriated.

When circumstances prevent the UN from conducting a repatriation inspection, consideration should be given to using the last validated inspection.

## **CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS**

23. **Principles of PSO.** In PSO there are no enemies. All troops within the mission area are to be regarded as friendly troops. Troops must be conversant with the principles guiding the conduct of this type of operation and these include:

a. **Firmness.** On matters of principle, peace keepers' integrity must show firmness of purpose and excellent solidarity or the force prestige will be lowered.



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A party to the dispute would use force, but he knows full well that his government or faction will have to answer in the Security Council, ECOWAS or AU later for the use of violence, having to face public opinion as well. To some extent, a peace-keeping force may become hostage to bad behaviour of a party threatening aggression. Terrorists, who are not very concerned about their own reputation, however accompany inhibited by such constraints. Nonetheless, if a government which in fact supports a terrorist group feels itself to be embarrassed by the terrorists' actions, it might be possible to come to a satisfactory agreement.

b. **Impartiality.** Total impartiality and neutrality are essential in order to retain the trust and confidence of the parties to the dispute and of the host government. If and when a peace-keeping force is suspected of favouring one of the parties concerned, the other party will no longer trust the peace-keeping force. Once mutual trust has evaporated, the peace-keeping force will find it difficult to implement its mandate. The parties involved are usually concerned about their honour, and an unwise word or act which pokes fun at one of the parties or injures its self-esteem will result in bitterness, non-cooperation, and perhaps hostility, and may jeopardize the peace-keeping operation.

c. **Clarity of Intention.** It is essential that both sides are made fully aware of what the peace-keeping forces are trying to achieve and why. Failure in this respect will lead to misunderstandings and distrust, hard to put right.

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d. **Anticipation.** Incidents likely to provoke violence should be anticipated and timely action taken to prevent them. This may involve the rapid deployment of peace keeping forces between the 2 sides, before an incident develops into a serious situation, in order to achieve local superiority.

e. **Avoidance of the Use of Force.** The use of force is not an end itself to peace keeping. You must be aware that:

- (1) Non-violent methods alone may be enough to solve the problems.
- (2) Conduct and negotiations are essential methods.
- (3) Clever leadership is decisive in achieving good results.
- (4) Initiative on the part of all ranks to carry out the task is vital.

f. **Recognition of Host Government's Authority.** A peace keeping force deployed in a country is invited by its government. It can remain there only as agreed upon by that government. While a peace keeping force enjoys certain immunities, its members however, must respect the host country's laws and customs in turn.

g. **Integration.** A peace keeping force must be integrated in 2 respects:

- (1) The national contingents must all be dependent on one another. This is usually achieved by allotting, *inter alia*, responsibilities for logistic support, comms, and airlift to different

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countries so that no contributor is perceived to exercise undue influence.

(2) When a confrontation is likely between the peace keeping force and one or both of the parties, it is wise to interpose a small group drawn from as many national contingents as possible or a force reserve in order to demonstrate solidarity and to enhance the hostage effect mentioned earlier.

24. **Ethics of Peace Keeping.** The Comd must ensure that the conduct of own troops participating in a PSO conforms with internationally accepted standards and always within the law. Troops must have access to the following:

- a. Code of Conduct (Issued by Higher HQ).
- b. Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) - Issued by Unit.
- c. General Conventions.
- d. Order of the day issued by the Force Comd.

25. **Use of Force.** Article 51 of the UN Charter specifically states the customary international law principle underlying all rules of engagement, that is, the inherent right of individual and collective self defence against an armed attack. International law requires that any use of force be in response to hostile acts or a demonstration of hostile intent, and the principle of proportionality requires that the use of force be limited in intensity, duration and scope to that which is necessary to counter the attack and ensure the continued safety of the force. It is important to note that specific rules of engagement for an operation are always classified to prevent giving tactical advantage to any potential threat to the force; however, it is

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common for a force commander to extract or provide unclassified summary to the troops as was the case with the Joint Force during "Operation Restore Hope" in Somalia.

26. **Unit Activities in Mission Area.** Usually the task of participating contingents will be broadly stated in the Mandate and the Force Commander (FC) will further specify the specific tasks of various units in his orders. However, there may be others depending on the nature of the overall mission of the force or when the situation changes. These include:

- a. Observation.
- b. Patrolling.
- c. Interposing.
- d. Control of movement.
- e. Control of supplies.
- f. Guarding of VP/KP and fence area.
- g. Riot control.
- h. Show of force.
- i. Liaison with/between the opposing parties.
- j. Negotiations.
- k. Humanitarian and economic activities.

15. **Community Relations.** In order to win the hearts and minds of the people, own troops will also be engaged in the following humanitarian duties in conjunction with other recognised NGOs like Red Cross, Red Crescent, Medicine Sans Frontiers etc:

- a. Medicine assistance to the local population.
- b. Tracing of missing family members.
- c. Family/loved ones visitation arrangements.
- d. Postal arrangements.
- e. Assistance in the provision of relief aid.
- f. Facilitate the free movement of doctors, nurses

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and medical supplies to and within remote outlying rural areas, as well as to and within sealed off enclaves.

- g. Medical and casualty evacuation of combatants with the approval of both parties.
- h. Protection and security of minority groups.
- i. Distribution of relief to those in need.
- j. Transportation of persons for transfer/evacuation.
- k. Mine field marking and clearing.
- l. Material assistance.
- m. Food assistance.
- n. Engineering works.
- o. Building of bridges.
- p. Provision of escorts to oversee and facilitate agricultural activity.
- q. Assistance in negotiating and implementing arrangements for the harvesting and disposal of crops in disputed areas.
- r. Arbitration in disputes over land, water, rights and freedom of movement of humans and animals.
- s. Investigation of cases of theft of or damage to crops.
- t. Liaison assistance over repairs of property, including schools and churches.
- u. Handling and transporting crops across demarcation lines.
- v. Assistance in negotiations for the restoration of public services.
- w. Distribution of welfare benefits.
- x. Humanitarian visits.
- y. Resettlement and rehabilitation.
- z. Assist in repair of implements eg trucks, farming implements etc.

- aa. Provision of water.

## **PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT**

27. As crisis erupted in different parts of the world, the UN Security Council authorized the formations of several UN missions with their required mandates. Over time, it was observed that more emphasis should be placed on the protection of most vulnerable people in crisis areas where UN mission exist. This view was amplified after the Rwanda genocide where UN armed personnel was unable to provide protection for the vulnerable civil populace.

28. **Briefing of visitors at VP/CP.** PSO attract a lot of dignitaries and International observers. It is therefore necessary that all troops, particularly officers and SNCOs know the procedure for briefing of visitors and the content of such briefing; which includes:

- a. Location of the OP/CP.
- b. Task/purpose.
- c. General observation, limitations, observation techniques etc.
- d. Nearest troops positions, HQ, direction and distance to other positions.
- e. Nearest position(s) belonging to other factions in the areas, distance and strength.
- f. Manning of the Ops, Relief of observers and the max time of observation.
- g. Brief about the equipment (very short/simple demo) being used at the OP/CP.
- i. Logistics.
- j. Special regulations.

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- k. Latest events. End of brief. Question?

### **DEBRIEF**

29. Units returning from PSO must be properly debriefed. A Comd must ensure that every soldier of his unit contributes to the debriefing. This could be achieved if Platoon Comds first debrief their men when they are about to leave the mission area. Coy Comds will then debrief their Platoon Comds after which they will be debriefed by the CO. This procedure will ensure that whatever information the CO gives while being debriefed on arrival covers every aspect of the operation. Emphasis must be placed on the following during debriefing:

- a. Preparation for the mission prior to departure.
- b. Adequacy of the provision made - Any deficiency? Why?
- c. Problems enroute.
- d. Reception on arrival at mission area.
- e. Situation on the ground on arrival at mission area.
- f. Relief in line.
- g. Conduct of the operation; to cover:
  - (1) Unit mission or task and mode of execution.
  - (2) Activities of all other units in the mission area.
  - (3) Areas of security interest to own country.
  - (4) Geography, Politics, economic activities, religion and culture of the mission area.
  - (5) Problems encountered during the operation.
  - (6) Losses in men and material.
  - (7) Potentials of the countries visited (Military,

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Political and Economic).

(8) Desirability of further participation in the operation. Comds are to comment on procedure for rotation of units, especially as it affects the following:

- (a) Warning Order.
  - (b) Preparation for move.
  - (c) Policy on weight approved per soldier.
  - (d) Policy on procurement of personal effects.
  - (e) Stock- taking.
  - (f) Movement of vehs, eqpt and sp wpns.
  - (g) Movement Order.
  - (h) Manifest.
  - (i) Tps maint enroute.
- h. Reception on arrival at disembarkation point.

## **SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS**

1. What preparations should be made by a unit earmarked for PSO.
2. What is SOFA. Explain in detail its content.



## **CHAPTER 14**

### **IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE**

#### **INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE**

1. The military is assigned various tasks during IS situations. These tasks fall under its constitutional roles in aid of civil authority and, therefore, have the necessary legal backing.
2. The objective of this chapter is to provide the candidates with an understanding of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) as all the tasks the military is required to perform when invited to intervene in an IS situation. The tasks discussed here must be completed as situations requiring new methods based on prevailing circumstances could arise.

#### **DESCRIPTION OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE**

3. Improvised Explosive Devices incorporate 5 significant components to function effectively. These components include the main charge, initiator, power source, switch or firing system and casing or container.
  - a. **Container.** A casing or container is an item that houses the whole or principal components of an IED. Containers include gas cylinders, dead animals, pipes, backpacks, jugs, briefcases, vests, and vehicles.
  - b. **Main Charge.** The main charge is the explosive component of an IED. It provides the explosion to destroy the target. Some examples of a primary charge are military

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explosives such as research department explosives and trinitrotoluene gotten from military munitions; commercial explosives such as dynamite used in quarries are readily available for purchase in the market; and home-made explosives such as ammonium nitrate sourced from fertilisers. The main charge could be mixed with some enhancement like fuel and shrapnel for a more damaging effect.

c. **Initiator**. The initiator is a sensitive, high-explosive device that detonates under relative heat, friction, flash, or shock. They are usually referred to as blasting caps or detonators.

d. **Power Source**. The power source is a component that stores and releases electrical current to initiate an IED. The most commonly used power source in IEDs is the 9V dry cell battery.

e. **Switch or Firing System**. This is the component of an IED designed to actuate or trigger the device. Insurgents and terrorists specifically employ switches to fire or arm an IED.

## **TYPES OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE**

4. IEDs are classified in different ways depending on the parameters considered. In terms of mode of operation, IEDs can be categorised into command, victim-operated, radio-operated, timed-operated, vehicle-borne, and person-borne IEDs.

a. **Command IEDs**. Command IEDs are triggered by a wire from the operator to the device. Command action is designed to go off at the terrorist's action. The IED uses a direct link between the firing point and the explosive device, allowing

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the insurgent to choose the precise moment of initiation. These are often used against targets that have previously set patterns or against targets of opportunity. The types of command IEDs are:

(1) **Command Wire**. **This** uses a physical wire connected to the power source. The operator manually triggers the device by joining together the negative and positive ends of a wire to complete the circuit, thereby detonating the IED.

(2) **Command Pull**. **This** uses a physical pull mechanism. An insulator attached to a cord or a handle is placed between two electrical conductors to stop the complete circuit. The explosion initiates once the operator pulls the cord to remove the insulator.

b. **Victim-operated IED**. The target itself triggers a Victim-operated IED. It could be armed with pressure plates, pull switches or release switches. This is very common with BHT activities in the NE. The most commonly used victim-operated IEDs are,

(1) **Offset**. The main charge, switch, and power source are deployed separately; however, the switch is placed strategically so the victim can easily trigger it.

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- (2) **All-in-One**. It integrates all components, including the main charge, switch, and initiator, into a single device with the switch on top.
- (3) **The Pressure Plate** integrates all the components in one place except the switch, which is placed separately.
- c. **Radio IED**. Radio-controlled IEDs are triggered when the operator sends a signal via the radio with the help of electromagnetic waves.
- d. **Timed IED**. Timers are set at a specific time to trigger the IED. Some IEDs are constructed with timed or delay switches designed to function at a predetermined time. They are mainly used on stationery targets.
- e. **Vehicle Borne IEDs**. Vehicle Borne IEDs (VBIEDs) are vehicles primed IEDs. When a suicide bomber is inside the car, it is referred to as a Suicide Vehicle Borne IED (SVBIED). However, some key features or characteristics of the Vehicle Borne IEDs may aid detection. These include irregular additions, noticeable sagging, and unusual scratches.
- f. **Person Borne IED**. Suicide bombers carry Person Borne IEDs. A Suicide bomber carries a vest rigged with explosives. The IED is triggered by the suicide bomber or by another operator from a distance. Suicide bombers could also use vehicles rigged with explosives in their attack.

## **TACTICAL SIGN RECOGNITION AWARENESS**

5. It is the ability to detect or deduce signs of a potential threat; it enhances a soldier's capabilities to recognise or identify enemy activities that could endanger their troops.

### **DEFINITION OF SIGN**

6. It is any evidence of change from the natural state's influence upon the environment by the passage of man, animal or machinery.

### **CATEGORIES OF SIGN**

7. The following are the categories of signs:

a. **Top Sign.** This is any sign from the ankle above to the height of the person or equipment carried. This could be markings on trees or pieces of clothing on a tree.

b. **Ground Sign.** Any sign from the ankle below to the ground. Concealment of an IED will inevitably leave an element of a ground sign. The following are the characteristics of ground signs: discardable, colour change, disturbance, transference regularity and flattening.

8. **Discardable.** These are items that the enemy may intentionally or unintentionally leave behind at the emplacement site of an IED. Examples of discardable are cigarette butts, wires and bits of tape used for concealing IED components.

9. **Colour Change.** When the enemy places an IED in the ground, the disturbance of the ground often leads to a colour variation between the soil above the IED and the surrounding area. Colour change could also result from footsteps on green vegetation and the effects of the explosive chemicals on the colour of the soil.

10. **Disturbance**. Disturbance results from distortion in the natural arrangement of an environment. Disturbed organic matter or leaves under a shelter belt, discontinuation of a vehicle's tyre print along the main supply route, or a change in the colour of stagnant water could indicate an IED activity within that area.

11. **Transference**. Transference occurs when the IED takes soil or any other material from one area to conceal the IED at a separate location. Often, the transferred material will not naturally blend with the surrounding area. Examples of transference include shrubs or branches of another tree used to conceal an IED. Additionally, wet soil found within the dry environment or sand transferred by foot from one place to another could be a sign of IED activities.

12. **Regularity**. Straight lines, circular, rectangular, or square shapes rarely exist in nature. When the terrorist tries to conceal an IED, some things appear out of place compared to nature's emplacement of soil, rocks, and vegetation. The lines and shapes could be attempts to conceal command wire, pull lines, trip lines, mines or pressure plates.

13. **Flattening**. Flattening occurs after a hole is filled back in. Air trapped between particles of soil escapes over time, and the top of the filled area collapses to a lower level than that of the surrounding area. This is often evident after rains and extended periods.

## **IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE INDICATORS**

14. The primary indication of an IED will be a change in the environment. Vigilant observation of these subtle indicators can increase the likelihood of security operatives detecting IEDs before they detonate. Examples of possible roadside IED indicators include but are not limited to the following:

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- a. **Suspicious Vehicles.** Vehicles acting strangely, following or ahead of your convoy for a long distance and then pulling over to the side of the road should be suspected.
- b. **Freshly Dug Holes, New Dirt, Piles of Rock or Gravel.** These are indications that someone recently buried something in the ground that might be an IED.
- c. **Visible or Hidden Wires.** Look out for coloured wires, visible or dug in. Wires are an essential indicator of IED presence.
- d. **Markers.** Markers are natural or artificial features used to trigger the IED at the right time or serve as warnings to unsuspecting troops about possible IEDs. The terrorist may leave behind visual indicators of an implanted device by accident or on purpose to inform fellow members of the terrorist group.
- e. **Unexploded Ordnances.** If you find any unexploded ordnance you didn't drop or place there, don't pick it up. It may kill or injure you. Mark the location and report the findings accordingly.

## **COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE MEASURES**

15. Counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) measures are based on three pillars: attacking the network, preparing the force, and defeating the device. These pillars could be undertaken at various levels of warfare.

- a. **Attacking the Network.** Efforts to attack the network include actions and activities against IED networks designed to interrupt the enemy's chain of activities by identifying and

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exploiting the networks' vulnerabilities and enabling offensive action against them. Success is based on improved intelligence analysis tools, persistent surveillance, reconnaissance, and information operations.

b. **Preparing the Force.** Preparing the force encompasses (C-IED) training at all levels, training on new equipment, tactics, techniques and procedures, and information management and dissemination.

c. **Defeat the Device.** Defeating the device involves the actions and activities of the troops to detect IEDs, neutralise them before they can be detonated, or mitigate the effects of detonation at the point of attack.

## **ACTIONS ON SIGHTING AN IED**

16. Handling scenarios involving IEDs is a very delicate affair. Experts in Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) have provided a drill sequence called the 5 Cs to ensure safe handling. This guide would help you in the event of an encounter with a suspected IED. **The 5 'C's Sequence is as follows: Confirm, Clear, Call, Cordon, and Control.**

a. **Confirm.** From a safe distance, look for IED indicators while attempting to confirm the suspected IED. Use all tools, including moving to a better vantage point and visual observation, to look for signs of an IED.

b. **Clear.** Evacuate the area to a safe distance of 300 meters around the IED. Assess whether your distance and cover are adequate and direct people from the danger area. Sweep the area for any secondary device or trigger person. Once the scene is safe, question, search, and detain as needed.



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c. **Call.** Call your higher headquarters and let them know what you have found by giving the following information:

- (1) Date and Time of your finding.
- (2) Location of the IED.
- (3) How can the EOD Team contact the reporting unit?
- (4) The best route is for the EOD Team.

d. **Cordon.** Establish blocking positions to prevent vehicle and foot traffic from approaching the IED. Establish a 360-degree inner and outer cordon to secure and dominate the area.

e. **Control.** Control the area until C-IED Operators arrive. Clear and set up an Entry Control Point (ECP) for first responders.

## **ACTION IN THE EVENT OF AN IED EXPLOSION**

17. The following information should be given in the event of evacuation from the location of an IED or bomb explosion. The people being evacuated should know:

- a. Why are they being evacuated?
- b. The location of the IED.
- c. Their temporary shelter and
- d. A safe route and how to get there.

## **REACTIONS ON IED ATTACK**

18. The expected initial reactions of troops in the event of an IED bomb explosion are as follows;

- a. Treat it as an ambush.
- b. Be conscious of direct and indirect enemy fire.
- c. Return fire within the ROE.
- d. Be conscious of a secondary explosion.
- e. Provide first aid if required.
- f. Attempt to locate the bomber.
- g. Send initial SITREP.
- h. Freeze movement, record all information, then send final SITREP.

## **SAFETY PRECAUTIONS**

19. The following safety precautions must be observed:

- a. Do not take risks to save life, eqpt or property.
- b. Always be alert.
- c. Keep up-to-date with terrorist eqpt and techniques.
- d. Avoid searching at night if you can, except there are strong Op reasons for doing so.
- e. Always assume that suspicious items are booby-trapped.

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- f. Do not touch anything if it has to be moved; check for a booby trap and move it by remote means (Hook and Line kits).
- g. Do not allow movement to be channelled.
- h. Apply all procedures correctly and obey safety precautions, particularly safety distance.
- i. Ensure the soak time is applied correctly.

### **SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS**

1. List components of an IED.
2. Mention types of IEDs.
3. List categories of signs.
4. What actions should be carried out on sighting an IED?

## **CHAPTER 15**

### **MEDIA OPERATIONS**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

1. Media Operations (MO) are those activities carried out by individuals or organisations using traditional, social and all available media to get information on specific subjects for strategic and operational objectives. The main effort of MO in any military operation is to communicate the principal themes and messages to the appropriate audiences in pursuit of the desired effect while remaining sensitive to media interests. This is an integral part of any contemporary military operation.

2. This chapter aims to provide the candidates with an understanding of MO and all the military's tasks when invited to intervene in an IS situation. The tasks discussed here still need to be completed, as conditions that require new methods based on prevailing circumstances could arise.

#### **MEDIA OPERATIONS FACTORS**

3. It is essential to understand the factors that characterise media operations. This would give commanders direction to plan within the overall campaign planning process. The factors considered in media operations include the levels of command (strategic, operational and tactical levels), target audience, and public and political support. The 3 factors of media operations are:

- a. **Strategic, Operational and Tactical Levels.** The divisions between strategic, operational and tactical levels are becoming increasingly blurred. Through the media spotlight, minor tactical events can escalate to have a strategic effect and

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generate a need for strategic leaders, such as government ministers, to respond quickly. Clear command and control structures, well-understood areas of delegated responsibility and effective military-media relations are required at all levels. Occasionally, to get tactical details straight to the strategic level quickly, it may be necessary to short-circuit the primary command and control channels for the flow of information. When this occurs, immediate efforts will be required to bring all those bypassed up to date.

b. **Target Audiences.** The aim of media operation (ways) is to provide information to several audiences (Ends) via the media (Means), all of which support the strategic aim. A successful media operation conveys audiences accurate, timely information and the right message. It must be appreciated that audiences are not homogenous, and their opinions will vary depending on the nature of their location, political preferences, culture, and ethnicity. What is considered a priority audience may differ between the strategic, operational and tactical commanders and the media itself. In effect, audiences could be categorised into 5 distinct groups requiring specific media operation actions. These different audiences are:

- (1) Domestic Audience.
- (2) International Audience.
- (3) Joint Operations Area Regional Audience.
- (4) Joint Operations Area Local Audience.
- (5) Internal Audience.

At the tactical level, the local audience of the Joint Operations Area tends to be the key target audience for deployed commanders, for whom effective MO will be essential in securing local consent and, thus, freedom of manoeuvre.

4. **Public and Political Support**. Military operations undertaken by nations to pursue their national and international interests depend on public and political support for their success. Commanders at all levels should contribute to building and sustaining this support through positive engagement and effective media handling for many related reasons, which include:

- a. Deployed forces must continually demonstrate their accountability to their democratically elected governments.
- b. Public support from the local audience enhances a commander's freedom of action, making him less vulnerable to external interference and overly restrictive Rules of Engagement. Support from international and regional audiences tends to enhance freedom of manoeuvre through consent.
- c. Positive media coverage of deployed military operations sustains morale and promotes an image of the Armed Forces as relevant, professional, and valued by the nation.
- d. Public support assists in maintaining cohesion between allies and coalition partners.
- e. A positive portrayal of the military, particularly when operational success is achieved, supports the longer-term justification for resources and aids recruiting and retention.
- f. To provide a rebuttal of inaccurate or untrue stories.

## **MEDIA OPERATIONS IN WAR**

5. The wars in former Yugoslavia showed that the battle for hearts and minds is as essential as the battle for territory. The media arena is often where that battle for hearts and minds is conducted. Media operations become a rallying point for all media activities undertaken to ensure the delivery of accurate and timely information to selected

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audiences through the media during war, conflict or other crises. The principal role of the theatre's media operations staff is to achieve communication effects by delivering messages. Specifically, they are required to conduct a range of tasks, principally to:

- a. Keep the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) abreast of media activities.
- b. Advise the JTFC on the themes and messages being pursued at the strategic level.
- c. Assist the JTFC in directly dealing with the media (including appointing a spokesperson).
- d. Plan, coordinate and implement facilities for media assignments.
- e. Provide media lines to support key information objectives.
- f. Handle the media aspects of serious incidents, including briefing and rebuttal if delegated.
- g. Provide direction to the Component Commanders and their Media Operations staff.
- h. Ensuring press releases issued within the Joint Operations Area do not provide information of value to an adversary.
- i. Devise a coherent and robust Operations Security plan across all levels of media contact.
- j. Conduct appropriate media monitoring and analysis.

6. The key Media Operation activities with particular focus on combat situations include but are not limited to the following:

- a. Press Statements.
- b. Press Release.
- c. Media Enquires.
- d. Media Escorting.
- e. Media Monitoring.

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- f. Press Conference.
- g. Background Briefing.
- h. Press Facility Tour.
- i. News Articles.
- j. Publicity Material.
- k. Documentaries.
- l. Combat Camera Teams.
- j. Social Media Engagement.

7. **Combat Camera Teams.** The Combat Camera Teams are personnel from the military public relations departments or directorates. They possess the requisite training and appropriate equipment to produce media effects from videos, photographs, and audio, which could be used to project a positive image and build a concrete reputation for the military. Some advantages of having Combat Camera Teams include the following:

- a. Ability to tell your own story the way you want it.
- b. Builds a positive image for the military in the public domain.
- c. Opportunity to create a lasting history of campaigns for the military through archiving.

9. **Social Media Engagement.** Social media engagement is an essential aspect of media operations. It enables the military to effectively communicate their message, engage with the public, and adapt to the digital landscape of modern media. Some of how social media engagement can influence media operations include, but are not limited to, the following:

- a. **Reach and Influence.** Social media platforms have a massive user base, with billions of people actively engaging on these platforms. By leveraging social media, the military can



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reach a broader audience, including civilians, policymakers, and international communities. This reach allows for increased visibility, influence, and the ability to shape narratives and public perception.

b. **Direct Communication**. Social media provides direct and immediate communication between the military and the public. It allows the military to bypass traditional media channels and engage with the public directly. This direct communication enables the military to share timely updates, correct misinformation, and provide accurate information about their activities and objectives.

c. **Rapid Information Dissemination**. In today's fast-paced digital age, social media enables the military to disseminate information quickly and efficiently. It allows for real-time reporting, sharing of news updates, and distributing essential announcements. This speed is crucial in crises, emergency responses, and combat operations, where accurate information and public awareness are vital.

d. **Public Relations and Reputation Management**. Social media provides a platform for the military to manage its public image and engage in public relations efforts. It allows the military to highlight its achievements, showcase its humanitarian efforts, and promote positive stories. The military can build trust, counter negative narratives, and shape public opinion by engaging with the public on social media.

## **PRINCIPLES OF MEDIA OPERATIONS IN WAR**

10. Media Operations in contemporary times are a significant factor in determining the success of war or MOOTW. Hence, they are guided

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by some basic principles that should be observed to ensure the achievement of the overall operational objective. They include end-state, truth, credibility, security, timelines, and preparation.

11. **End-State**. Media Operations should focus on the desired end-state. Accordingly, media operations are integral to the military campaign plan to achieve and sustain domination of the integrated battle space. The main effort in media operations is to communicate the principal themes and messages in pursuit of the end state while remaining sensitive to the media focus and areas of interest.

12. **Truth**. All communication with the media must be honest, transparent, and accurate. Commanders and staff should ensure the integrity of the information they pass to the press. Information should be withheld only when disclosure adversely affects Operation Security (OPSEC), force safety, or individual privacy. Deliberately misleading the media should be avoided, no matter how tempting or tactically advantageous it may seem.

13. **Credibility**. Media Operations staff should be credible with both the military and the media. They should be candid and avoid jargon. They should also treat all media equally.

14. **Security**. Statements issued to the media must not provide information that may be valuable to an adversary. Information should not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the force from criticism or embarrassment. In some cases, it may be necessary to seek media cooperation. Media operations staff should use their judgment to balance the requirement for openness with the dangers of putting service personnel at risk.

15. **Timeliness**. The globalisation of communications and the accelerating demand for information have turned news gathering by

the media into an unrelenting, 24-hour activity. Commanders and their staff should expect the international and local media to be present during operations and be prepared to engage with them all day and night. Media operations staff must be swift and responsive to breaking news and require the mechanisms to verify and pass credible stories and other vital information to all levels of command as soon as possible. Adverse news should also be passed as early as possible and consistent with Operations Security and the care and welfare of service personnel and their families.

16. **Preparation.** Media Operations cannot be conducted suddenly after an operation begins. They involve building relationships within media organisations, consulting commanders, media staff, and journalists, and undertaking training so those involved are fully prepared before the operation. Strong relationships are also required to cope with the inevitable tensions that usually arise.

## **HOSTILE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND MEDIA OPERATIONS**

17. During war, conflicts or crises, the adversary manages information, usually contrary to military media operations. As such, military commanders should be conscious of this fact and plan to counter it effectively. It is therefore necessary to point out some key objectives of hostile Information Management and Media Operations, which include but are not limited to the following:

- a. To disrupt the efforts of the government and the military.
- b. To mobilise civil support for their cause.
- c. To influence civil opinion and perception in their favour.
- d. To influence international opinion positively in their favour.

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- e. To mobilise international support against their adversary.
- f. To encourage mobilisation and recruitment against an adversary.

### **CAPABILITIES OF MEDIA OPERATIONS IN WAR**

18. Media Operations are critical to the successful outcome of any mission on the modern battlefield. They also provide a vital link between military operations across various spectrums. Equally, Media Operations help to promote activity, capture images and footage, train others to face the media, and facilitate the delivery of clear messages to audiences, which assists the commander in achieving his overall mission. Some capabilities of Media Operations for military operations, among others, include:

- a. Target audience engagement.
- b. Effective storytelling and setting narrative.
- c. Setting counter-narratives.
- d. Downplay Adversary Narrative.
- e. Credibility to own course of action.

### **SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS**

- 1. List tasks of media operation staff in the theatre.
- 2. List principles of media operations in war.
- 3. List key media activities.

## **CHAPTER 16**

### **DISASTER MANAGEMENT**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

1. Disaster Management (DM) involves coordinating and integrating all activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery capability. DM is multi-jurisdictional, multi-sectoral, multi-disciplinary, and multi-resource.
2. The objective of this chapter is to provide the candidates with an understanding of DM's role in a nation's national security and introduce them to the roles of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) in DM.

#### **DM TERMINOLOGIES**

3. **Disaster Preparedness.** The readiness of communities and institutions to predict and, where possible, prevent disasters, reduce their impact, respond to and cope with their consequences, and recover from them. This involves putting structural and non-structural measures in place to prepare, prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from a disaster.
4. **Disaster Response.** Disaster response refers to assisting during or immediately after a disaster to save lives, minimise injury, meet the immediate basic subsistence needs of affected people, and ensure speedy and sustainable recovery. This includes search and rescue, relief intervention, rehabilitation, reconstruction and recovery.
5. **Disaster Response Plan.** A course of action designed to

help an organisation respond effectively to a significant future event or situation that may or may not happen.

6. **Disaster Risk Reduction.** Measures to avoid or limit disaster losses include minimising the hazard, reducing exposure, and enhancing coping and adaptive capacity. This is a systematic approach to identifying, assessing, and reducing disaster risk. It aims to improve capacity, minimise vulnerability and reduce disaster risk to avoid or limit the adverse impact of hazards within the broad context of sustainable development.

7. **Disaster Prevention.** Activities to provide outright avoidance of the adverse impact of hazards or disasters. Investing in preventive measures, public awareness and education, and changing attitudes and behaviour promotes a "culture of prevention.

8. **Recovery.** Rehabilitation and reconstruction activities are necessary for a rapid, durable return to normalcy.

## **PHASES OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT**

9. There are 4 phases of disaster management, which are helpful frameworks to build disaster recovery and business continuity plans. The 4 phases are as follows:

a. **Mitigation.** In the mitigation phase, the goal is to prevent future emergencies and take steps to minimise their effects. This phase occurs before a disaster happens. During this phase, an organisation will take necessary steps to protect people and properties while decreasing the risks and consequences of a catastrophe. Examples of mitigation are structural (building of buffer dam, drainages, reservoir, channel improvement, flood wall and sandbag) and non-structural (flood plan regulation, awareness creation, capacity building

and advocacy visits).

b. **Preparedness.** The preparedness phase also occurs before the disaster takes place. In this phase, an organisation attempts to understand how a disaster might affect productivity. The organisation will also provide appropriate education while implementing adequate preparedness measures to forestall disasters. Some examples of preparedness measures include training and education of people and undertaking full-scale exercises on disaster preparedness.

c. **Response.** In the response phase, the goal is to protect people and properties during an emergency, disaster, or crisis. The response phase occurs in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. It is imperative to state that the safety and well-being of the people depend on preparedness levels before disaster strikes. Examples of response measures include public warning, alerting system, SAR, relief intervention, and dead recovery.

d. **Recovery.** The recovery phase entails rebuilding after a disaster to return operations to normal. This phase takes place after a disaster and could last 6 – 12 months (even longer, depending on the severity of the incident). Some examples of recovery measures are temporary shelter, social welfare provision, rehabilitation, and reconstruction efforts.

## **PREVALENT DISASTERS IN NIGERIA**

10. Some notable disasters in the country that impact negatively on the well-being of the populace are as follows:

- a. Flood
- b. Oil pipeline vandalism/explosion

- c. Insurgency/ terrorism/banditry
- d. Pollution
- e. Building and bridge collapse
- f. Oil spillage
- g. Gully erosion
- h. Windstorm and rainstorm
- i. Ethno-religious conflicts
- j. Droughts
- k. Plane crashes
- l. Road traffic crashes
- m. Boat mishap, etc.

## **ROLES OF NEMA**

11. The NEMA is an agency focused on DM in all parts of the country. The agency was established in 1999 and functions to formulate policies relating to DM in the country. The agency also coordinates with state-level emergency agencies called State Emergency Agencies (SEMA).

12. Despite NEMA's unique roles, it is imperative to state that DM is everybody's business; therefore, everybody (individual, community, or organisation) has a role to play. DM needs to be inclusive (participatory), transparent, and impartial.

- a. Formulate Policies relating to DM.
- b. Monitor the state of preparedness of all organisations for



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effective and efficient DM in Nigeria.

- c. Collate data from relevant organisations for enhanced planning and DM.
- d. Coordinate the activities of all voluntary organisations engaged in emergency operations in the country.
- e. Coordinate and facilitate the provision of required resources for search and rescue and other disaster curtailment activities in response to distress calls.
- f. Liaise with SEMA, UN agencies, and other organisations to reduce natural and other disasters.

### **CLASSIFICATION OF DISASTER OCCURRENCE**

13. The primary objective of DM is to reduce the impact of disasters, save lives and property and achieve rapid and effective recovery. To achieve this, disaster occurrence is classified into three different levels. These are as follows:

- a. **Minor.** A minor emergency/disaster could be handled within the available resources of the concerned individual or the immediate community.
- b. **Major.** A major disaster is one whose impact overwhelms the capability of the individual or the local community and requires response or assistance from the state or external support.
- c. **Catastrophic.** A catastrophic disaster occurs without warning; in most cases, its magnitude is so large that the

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president declares it a national emergency. In such cases, all government agencies, stakeholders, and, in extreme cases, international assistance are involved. Intervention resources are also requested from state and federal government agencies.

### **SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS**

1. What is DM?
2. Define the following:
  - a. Disaster preparedness.
  - b. Disaster response.
  - c. Disaster response plan.
  - d. Disaster risk reduction.
  - e. Disaster prevention.
  - f. Recovery.
3. What are the phases of DM?
4. What are the roles of NEMA in DM?
5. What is the classification of disaster occurrence?

## **CHAPTER 17**

### **NIGHT OPERATIONS**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

1. Modern night fighting aids and equipment change the battlefield environment at night. Darkness is no longer a blanket of concealment but offers opportunities for surprise in offensive and defensive operations. Surprise is one of the significant principles of tactics because it enables a commander to seize the initiative, outwit his adversary and dictate the course of the battle. Night marches and night combat demand the troops more than similar daytime operations. The responsible commanders must bear this in mind if reverses are to be avoided. Therefore, there must be some nights during which the troops may rest because even relatively quiet sleep in the daytime cannot replace rest at night.

2. The objective of this chapter is to provide the student with an understanding of how the conduct of night operations can be used in support of military operations. It will also introduce the candidates to the various types of training required for a successful night operation.

#### **PRINCIPLES OF NIGHT OPERATIONS**

3. Night operations call for disciplined, cool, self-reliant troops. The mental strain involved in night combat is severe; it is easier to endure in periods of activity than during long spells of inactivity. This is why at night, even more so than by day, he who takes the initiative has the advantage. However, since orientation and coordination will become increasingly complex, this initial advantage diminishes as the attack progresses. Darkness helps achieve surprise, and the attacker will benefit more from the defender's inability to aim his fire effectively.

4. **Exercise of Command.** In a situation where a daytime operation promises success, a resolute and bold commander will continue the action into the night. Determined pursuit of a weakened enemy may result in a significant victory. Although mobile units are generally most suitable for launching a pursuit, foot infantry may be employed to great advantage, significantly when the terrain and weather conditions reduce the mobility of motorised forces. The success of night operations depends primarily on careful planning, detailed preparation, simplicity of the operation order and tactical procedure, achievement of surprise, and the leaders' calmness and circumspection.

5. **Orientation.** Night orientation is based on careful daytime reconnaissance, thorough study of maps, including captured ones, and the knowledge of prominent landmarks and celestial bodies. To facilitate orientation, one may use the prismatic compass, radio beam apparatus, line-of-sight fire by mortars, illumination of enemy terrain by artillery fire on inflammable targets; fires lighted behind very lights, parachute flares, searchlights, machine gun tracer fire, mortar salvos at prearranged orienting points, and specific night fire orientation tables.

6. **Reconnaissance.** Surveillance must be uninterrupted; the most helpful information is frequently gathered through night reconnaissance. During the hours of darkness, friendly patrols can penetrate enemy territory to points from which they can observe enemy movements during the daytime. In darkness, reconnaissance patrols can usually determine only whether or not the enemy occupies a specific area. To gather more detailed information about the enemy forces' strength, composition, and weapons, reconnaissance in force must be carried out by patrols that should return with prisoners of war.

7. **Security.** Security is closely related to surveillance at night, when troops are at rest, in combat, or on the move. Precautions must be taken against surprise ground and air attacks and observation by the enemy. All units, even those in rear areas, must be highly security conscious. A strong infantry point, marching 300 to 400 yards ahead of a reinforced combined arms battalion, will usually provide adequate protection for a night movement. The distance between this advance guard and the main body depends primarily upon the degree of darkness and should generally be 1,000 yards. Flank security elements should remain close to the moving column; their strength depends on the nature of the terrain.

8. **Assembly.** Before launching a night attack against well-established enemy positions, proper assembly preparations must be made. If a major offensive operation is planned, several nights will generally be needed for the approach, assembly, and execution of the attack, especially during summer when nights are short. Assembly areas must be protected.

## **TRAINING FOR NIGHT OPERATIONS**

9. Training is a prerequisite for success in battle; training programs must simultaneously utilise lessons from experience and anticipate future developments, particularly in technology. No matter how fundamental the changes in tactics and techniques, it will always be up to the individual soldier to do the actual fighting. For this purpose, he must be trained and indoctrinated. The more extensive the training, the more effective it will be. Training and educational programs must be so devised that they stimulate the soldier's initiative. Only on that basis will military planners be able to shape a powerful and flexible instrument capable of withstanding war. In night combat, he who is conditioned to darkness will be at an advantage,

and training must, therefore, strive to restore the soldier's native sensitivity, which has been dulled by city life. Against a potential opponent who has the innate characteristics of a tough, ruthless, and cunning night fighter, proper training is indispensable.

## **INDIVIDUAL TRAINING**

10. Individual training should begin by familiarising the trainee with the peculiarities of the night. His eyes and ears must be conditioned to a variety of unaccustomed impressions. Since this conditioning process is gradual, starting with lectures and demonstrations may be practical. Competitive exercises should be initiated as early as possible since they arouse the trainee's interest in night combat. The recruit must learn that, at best, he can perceive only the outline of an object without any detail. He must get down on the ground since he can observe better from below. Distances are difficult to estimate in the dark, and the position of a distant light can, therefore, be easily misjudged. By lighting a flashlight, a match, or cigarette smoking, the soldier might betray his presence even to a somewhat distant foe. Sounds are transmitted most clearly at night, and the trainee must learn to differentiate between ordinary noises and those that should arouse suspicion. He can often hear otherwise inaudible noises by putting his ear to the ground.

11. To familiarise the trainee with nighttime conditions, preliminary marksmanship and range firing exercises should be shifted to the hours of darkness early in the training. Cross-country night marches may occasionally be combined with practice alerts. Since a sudden drop in temperature during the night or unexpected ground fog during the early morning hours may affect the trainee's health, he must be taught to take appropriate precautions. During the next stage of individual training, the recruit should learn to orient himself by the stars, prismatic compass, tracer, other signals, and terrain features briefly observed during daylight. He must know how to move silently,

erect and prone, at first across familiar, then across unfamiliar terrain, taking every precaution not to attract the enemy's attention with the clatter of weapons or equipment. He must prepare heavy weapons positions for fire during the daytime against potential night targets.

## **WEAPONS TRAINING**

12. A soldier's familiarity with his weapons' may be a decisive factor in night combat. To achieve complete mastery in manipulating weapons and equipment, the trainee must practice all postures first while in camp, then under simulated combat conditions and finally in the dark and blindfolded.

13. The last type of individual training can be given only in the field, and its objective is to perfect the trainee's skill until he qualifies for unit training. Each arm of the service will proceed according to established procedures.

## **UNIT TRAINING**

14. Squad training should emphasise firing practice at dusk, in the dark, by moonlight, and in artificial light. Firing practice should frequently be combined with an extended exercise, such as a strenuous march or reconnaissance problem, during which the unit should switch to extended formation after dusk. Only thus will the trainee get accustomed to the idea that he must be able to fight even after great physical exertion. Particular importance should be attached to firing practice as part of defence in twilight and moonlight to condition the trainee to enemy attacks and give him confidence in his unit's ability to defend itself during the various stages of darkness. Additional subjects of instruction are night patrolling and reconnaissance, combat patrol missions, teamwork in firing heavy weapons, execution of technical missions usually assigned to engineers, close combat against tanks from foxholes, first aid in

darkness, protection against frostbite, etc.

15. Advanced unit training embraces all types of combat, emphasising combined arms operations. Starting at the platoon level, this training phase culminates in large-scale combined arms manoeuvres. The lessons learned by the individual will now find their practical application in the field. Passing through the execution of different phases of night operations, the unit's training progresses to uninterrupted day and night exercises, emphasising various types of combat in darkness. The combined arms manoeuvres should feature cooperation between armoured, tactical air, and airborne units. The ideal night fighter is a self-reliant, fully integrated soldier commanded by an excellent, resourceful, thoughtful leader who inspires confidence and determination. Only if training can produce such men will an army have a chance of success against an adversary who not only is unhampered by darkness but even seems to thrive on it.

### **CONTROL AND DOMINATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD**

16. **Knowledge of the Ground.** Having an intimate knowledge of the ground is a tremendous advantage at night. This usually favours the defenders who have sat their position on their chosen ground, which they typically see in daylight. In offensive operations, it is vital that forces are carefully briefed on the ground from maps and air photographs and, if possible, given the opportunity to look at it in daylight. Extensive patrolling before offensive operations may be necessary to build up an accurate knowledge of the ground, routes, crossing places on river obstacles, etc, before starting primary night operations.

17. **Patrolling.** Effective patrolling can dominate the battlefield at night. Suppose patrols are regularly successful and morale ascends over enemy patrols. In that case, the commander will enjoy control



and domination over that battlefield at night, enabling him to retain the initiative.

18. **Surveillance**. The surveillance plan includes:

a. **Night Visibility Plan**. This is the commander's plan to illuminate the whole or part of the battlefield. He will have to decide when it is to his tactical advantage to illuminate with direct or indirect fire weapons. This is a crucial decision since he must decide whether the advantages of illuminating the enemy outweigh the advantages of giving away the positions of his forces. Strict discipline and control of the night visibility plan is therefore essential.

b. **Ground Surveillance Plan**. The GSP coordinates patrols, OPs, FOO and MFC zones of observation, aerial survey, and the use of surveillance devices. This will enable the commander to watch the battlefield at night and gather combat intelligence in time for him to react and retain the initiative.

## **CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BATTLEFIELD AT NIGHT**

19. At night and in conditions of poor visibility, the following effects are apparent:

- a. Reconnaissance and observation are strictly limited.
- b. Target acquisition and identification are complex.
- c. Movement is slowed down, and navigation could be more straightforward.
- d. Control of forces deployed in battle is brutal. Units have to be concentrated when moving with little dispersion between vehicles or groups of men.
- e. It is easy to get lost. If forces are lost, they cannot play an influential part in the battle.

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20. Night fighting aids are designed to overcome the limitations of poor visibility. The side that can be seen at night has a priceless advantage. Therefore, neutralising the enemy's night fighting aids and perfecting the best possible night visibility plan is constantly required.

### **SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS**

1. Mention 5 principles of night operation.
2. What are the types of training in night operations?
3. Explain how to achieve control and domination of the battlefield effectively.
4. Enumerate the characteristics of the battlefield at night.

### **FURTHER READING MATERIALS**

1. CSC Précis on CRW.
2. Keeping the Peace.
3. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.
4. The Nigeria Army Standard Operational Procedure for Internal Security.
5. Procedure for the Induction of NA troops into Operation.
6. National Counter Terrorism Strategy (Rev 2016)
7. Nigerian Army in MOOTW: COIN Ops
8. Nigerian Army in MOOTW: MACA
9. Nigerian Army in MOOTW: Inter-agency Cooperation.
10. Any other Publication on the Subject

**ANNEX A TO**  
**CHAPTER 1 TO**  
**TACTICS B**

**POLICE HANDOVER TO MILITARY**

1. I have come to the conclusion that the Nigerian Police are unable to control situation of lawlessness as perpetrated by some persons and that the assistance of the military has become necessary in restoring law and order.

2. I accordingly request such assistance and you are hereby reminded of the use of necessary minimum force to be determined by you to restore law and order.

3. Place of disturbance.....In .....  
LGA .....State .....

4. This request is authorized by the civil authority representative whose signature and seal appear below:

**PART 1**

**CIVIL AUTHORITY**

1. Full Name:..... Signature:.....

Date:..... Ranks/Appointment:.....

Official Seal .....

**POLICE OFFICER HANDING OVER**

2. Name:.....

Date:.....Signature:.....

Unit:.....

**MILITARY OFFICER TAKING OVER**

3. I hereby assume responsibility to use Military Force to restore law and order as requested:

Full Name..... Signature:.....

Date:..... Rank:.....Appointment:.....

Unit:..... Place: .....

Delete whichever is not applicable

**ANNEX B TO**  
**CHAPTER 1 TO**  
**TACTICS B**

**MILITARY HANDOVER TO POLICE**

1. I certify that law and order has been restored as requested on.....Day ..... of ..... LGA ..... State and I hereby handover to the Nigeria Police.

**MILITARY OFFICER HANDING OVER**

2. Full Name: .....  
Rank:.....Appointment:.....  
Place: .....DTG:.....  
Unit: .....

**POLICE OFFICER TAKING OVER**

3. Full Name: .....  
Date: ..... Time: ..... Signature:.....  
Rank:.....Appointment:.....  
Place: .....DTG:.....  
Unit: .....

**\*DTG Date Time Group.**

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**ANNEX C TO**  
**CHAPTER 1 TO**  
**TACTICS B**

**AUTHORITY FOR ARREST/DETENTION**

1. ....

No.....Rank:.....

Do hereby apply for authority to detain:

1. ....

2. ....

3. ....

4. ....

5. ....

6. ....

For the offence of:.....

Crime Diary Serial No:.....refers

.....

Name of the S.P.P.

Approved/Not Approved

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Date:.....

.....  
S.P.P's Sign  
Criminal 5 and 6  
(Warrant of Arrest)

**IN THE SUPREME MAGISTRATE COURT OF NIGERIA**

In the supreme/Magistrate's Court of the .....Judicial  
Division/Magisterial District.

No.....

Charge

Between:..... Complainant

And..... Defendant

To:.....

Complainant on oath has been made on the .....day  
of..... 20 ..... By.....  
that.....

Herein after called the defendant, on the .....Day  
At ..... in the judicial Division/Magisterial District at aforesaid

Did.....

.....

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And the defendant was thereupon summoned to appear  
before the Supreme/Magistrate's

Court of the ..... Judicial Division

Magisterial District

Sitting at..... on the .....day of  
.....20.....

At the hour of ..... in the.....noon to  
answer

to the said charge.

And has been made that the defendant was duly served with  
the summons but did not appear, and that such complaint is  
true

You are therefore hereby command to bring the defendant  
before the Supreme/Magistrate's Court of the Judicial  
Division/Magisterial District sitting at ..... forthwith to answer  
to the said complaint and be further dealt with according to law.

Date the.....y of ..... two thousand.....

.....

Judge/Magistrate

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**ANNEX A TO**  
**CHAPTER 2 TO**  
**TACTICS** **B**

**SPECIMEN OF A DIARY OF EVENT**

**Formation/Unit**.....

Serial	Date  Time	Persons involved including names of representatives, Police office etc	Events including brief details of orders, requests or advice received	Action taken(Including reasons) and results(including brief details of any orders issued	Time action taken or completed	Initials
(a)	(b)	(c )	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)

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**ANNEX B TO**  
**CHAPTER 2 TO**  
**TACTICS B**

**LOG SHEET**

**Formation/Unit** ..... Date ..... Sheet

No : .....

Serial	Time	To	From	Event	Action	Initials
(a)	(b)	(c )	(d)	(e )	(f)	(g)

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**OCCURRENCE REPORT**

Type of Occurrence: .....

Reported By: .....

Location: .....

Date/Time: .....

Casualties: .....

Personalities: .....

Weapons Used: .....

Miscellaneous Details: .....

**ANNEX D TO**  
**CHAPTER 2**  
**TO TACTICS B**

**SITUATION REPORT**

1. SITREP No: .....
2. Period Covered: From: ..... To: .....
3. General Review of the situation.
4. Details of activities of miscreants to include casualty, arrest etc.
5. Details of Police/Military activities.
6. Details of events in the civil society, to include people's reaction and perceptions.
7. General administration of committed Police/Military troops, to include administrative and logistic requirements.
8. General assessment/conclusion.

**Note: SITREP is sent on signal message form.**

**ANNEX E TO**  
**CHAPTER 2 TO**  
**TACTICS B**

**INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY**

1. INTSUM NO: .....
2. Period (..... up to ..... )

**SECTOR NO 1**

3. Identification and Disposition
  - a. Composition.
  - b. Location.
  - c. Boundaries.
  - d. Intentions.
  - e. Initial weapons/vehicle/eqpt sate.
4. Deductions.
5. Activities (e.g.).
  - a. Arson.
  - b. Looting.
  - c. Killing.
  - d. Hijacking.
6. Deductions.
7. Effectiveness.
  - a. Identified leaders, history and characteristics.
  - b. Effective strength.
  - c. New strategies and tactics.
  - d. Recruitment & E2-1 orcement.
  - e. Casualties.
  - f. Morale and discipline.

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- g. Support available.
  - 8. Deductions.
  - 9. Weather.
  - 10. Environment.
  - 11. Deductions.
  - 12. General Assessment.
- Note:** INTSUM is sent on signal message form.

**ANNEX F TO**  
**CHAPTER 2 TO**  
**TACTICS B**

**CONTENTS OF A PLANNING MAP**

1. A Planning Map is to include the following:
  - a. Colour Codes.
  - b. Symbols - Conventional or nonconventional.
  - c. Sections - Showing boundaries for formation units or groups.
  - d. All Vulnerable Points (VPs) e.g. Administrative Installations, Hospitals, Prisons, Water Works, Refineries, Banks and other essential Services
  - e. Communications/Signal Network.
  - f. Existing or projected security forces locations including HQs.
2. It is kept at the Joint Operations Room or the Field Operation HQ whenever established.

**ANNEX G TO**  
**CHAPTER 2 TO**  
**TACTICS B**

**CONTENTS OF A SITUATION MAP**

1. A Situation Map will contain the details of a planning map with all occurrences and timings superimposed. These will include:
  - a. Colour Codes.
  - b. Symbols - Conventional for nonconventional.
  - c. All Vulnerable Points e.g Administrative Installation, Hospitals, Prisons, Water Works, Refineries, Banks and other essential services.
  - d. Communication/Signal Network.
  - e. Existing or projected security forces locations including Headquarters.
2. This Map will be used for briefing of commanders, watch keepers etc.



**ANNEX A TO**  
**CHAPTER 6 TO**  
**TACTICS B**

**PROCEDURES FOR SEARCHING VEHICLES**

1. **Cars.** Cars should be systematically searched from front to rear as follows:
  - a. Sun visors.
  - b. Dashboard pockets or cubbyholes.
  - c. Behind dashboard (wires leading from instruments may conceal a small weapon or document).  
Under driver's seat.
  - d. Between drivers and passenger's seats.
  - e. Back of driver's seat (i.e between back of seat and bottom of back rest).
  - f. Door pockets.
  - g. Underneath movable mats.
  - h. Back seats.
  - i. Rear window panel shelf.
  - j. Luggage boot.
  - k. Under bonnet and spare wheel compartment.
  - l. Spare wheel.
  - m. All loose baggage and parcels.
  - n. Particular care must be paid to any apparently innocent articles such as umbrellas or newspaper which may be used for concealment.
2. **Buses.** When searching buses note must be taken of the places where people are sitting before they leave the vehicle. Proof of ownership articles found will otherwise be

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impossible. The same procedure applies as for cars, but all seats must be removed and searched.

3. **Goods Vehicles.** The procedure is similar to that for cars with the following additions:

a. **Wooden Body Construction.** Owing to the wooden body construction of some lorries, it is very simple to make effective places of concealment by the addition of enclosed panels, false bottoms, or the boarding up of spaces between the battens supporting the floor. The sides of lorries may be prepared in a similar manner. The best method of search in such cases is close examination from all angles and careful measurement.

b. **Twin Rear Wheels.** The space between twin rear wheels should be examined carefully

c. **Wooden Blocks (chocks).** Some good vehicles particularly those of heavy class, carry wheel chocks which are placed under the rear wheels of the vehicle to help the brakes, should the vehicles have to stop on a steep gradient. Through regular use, they become dirty, worn and greasy, and are generally thrown in the rear of the vehicles or carried in the driver's cab. Such blocks can be hollowed out to become good places of concealment, and should, therefore, be examined carefully.

d. **Gunny Sacks.** All gunny sacks should be lifted and searched. A common subterfuge is the concealment of articles under a heap of gunny sacks in

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an apparently unladen goods vehicle.

e. **Driver's Cab.** Particular attention should be given to the search of the driver's cab and the driver's mate.

4. **Motor Cycles.** Motor cycles are comparatively easy to search, but attention should be paid to the following:

a. **Petrol Tank.** This may have a false division.

b. **Tool Box or Case.** Open, remove all tools and examine.

c. **Rubber Handle Grips Controls.** Examine.

d. **Foot Rest Supports.** Examine foot rests and machine support.

e. **General.** Lamps, mudguards, and all hollow or tubular construction should be examined. A search should also be made under the saddle.

5. **Bicycle.** The following should be examined with care:

a. Handlebars and rubber grips.

b. Bells.

c. Lamps, dynamos, etc, including the back of reflector glasses.

d. The saddle.

e. All tubular framework, particularly open ends and joints.

f. Under mudguards and crankcase.

g. Saddle and tool tag.

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**ANNEX B TO**  
**CHAPTER 6 TO**  
**TACTICS B**

**CONTROL POINTS SPECIMEN HEADING FOR ORDERS**  
**FOR CONTRL POINT NUMBER**

Ref: Map .....

1. **Situation** (to include details of troops on flanks, important features within control patrol limits).

2. **Mission.** You are, He is to:

- a. Control all/a proportion of vehicles and pedestrians passing through the control point.
- b. Maintain law and order within your patrol limits (see sketch) by preventing damage to property or persons and by dispersing unlawful assemblies.

3. **Execution.**

a. Layout (sketch should be attached showing full details.

b. **Duties.** The following will be maintained permanently:

- (1) 1 Sentry per barrier.
- (2) 1 NCO per entry barrier.
- (3) 2 riflemen at Control Point HQ covering all barriers.
- (4) 2 men standing patrol in the observation post covering the control point.

c. **Opening of Fire.** Fire will not be ordered

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except in self defence.

**d. Patrols.**

- (1) Limit of patrolling (to be shown on sketch).
- (2) A patrol of not less than one section will be sent out on foot or in vehicles and must be prepared to prevent minor incidents.

**e. Control of Vehicles and Pedestrians.**

- (1) All vehicles and pedestrians will be slowed down and directed through the control point.
- (2) If vehicles are to be checked, they will be searched inside the barrier by the civil policeman (if available) otherwise by the barrier by the civil policeman (if available) otherwise by the barrier sentries and NCOs.

**f. Police:**

- (1) Allocation.
- (2) Duties.
  - (a) Checking and searching vehicles and persons.
  - (b) Acting as interpreters.
  - (c) Making arrests when necessary.
- (3) Administration. You are responsible for feeding and looking after the police allotted to you.

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**g. Lights.**

- (1) All NCOs and sentries on duty at night will carry touches.
- (2) The following lights will be put in position at night:
  - (a) A hurricane lamp at each policestop sign.
  - (b) A red hurricane lamp at the end of each knife rest near the middle of the road.

h. **Turnout.** The turnout and bearing of the soldiers on duty is of the utmost importance. You will ensure that all soldiers outside the rest and administrative are correctly and smartly dressed and move about in a soldierly manner.

**4. Administrative and Logistics:**

- a. Rest and administrative area (location).
- b. Stores (a suggested list of stores is given in Appendix M).
- c. Transport (location and use of the vehicle).
- d. Water point.
- e. Washing facilities.
- f. Cooking arrangements.
- g. Latrines.
- h. Medical (evacuation of casualties).

**5. Command and Signal:**

- a. Control Point HQ (Location and Composition).
- b. Company HQ (Location).
- c. Communications:

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- (1) To Company HQ.
- (2) To rest and administrative area.
- (3) To standing patrol.
- (4) To flanking units.
- d. List of important telephone numbers.
- e. Logs or diaries to be kept.
- f. SITREPs.

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**ANNEX C TO**  
**CHAPTER 6 TO**  
**TACTICS B**

**PATROLLING ORDER AIDE MEMOIRE**

1. **Situation:**

- a. **Topography.** Use maps, air photos, visual reconnaissance and patrol going map.
- b. **Adversary:**
  - (1) Strength.
  - (2) Weapons and dress.
  - (3) Known or likely locations and activities including past history.
- c. Movements of local inhabitants and civilians in area.
- d. **Own troops.** (including police).
  - (1) Clearance.
  - (2) Patrol activities of security forces include means of identification
  - (3) Air and artillery tasks.

2. **Mission.** This must be clear to the patrol commander. There are two types of patrol, namely:

- a. Reconnaissance Patrol takes a form of question or questions.
- b. Fighting Patrol definite object.



3. **Execution:**

- a. Strength and composition of patrol.
- b. Time out and anticipated time of return.
- c. Method of movement to patrol area.
- d. Routes out and in (if helicopter are to be used, location and states of LZs).
- e. Boundaries.
- f. Probable bounds and RVs.
- g. Formations.
- h. Reception and cover plan.
- i. Actions to be taken on contact.
- j. Action if ambushed.
- k. Action if lost.

l. **Do Not.**

- (1) Move through defiles.
- (2) Cut foliage unnecessarily.
- (3) Return by the same route as that used for outward move.
- (4) Allow weapons to become jammed through dirt.
- (5) Relax because you are nearing base.

4. **Administration and Logistics:**

a. **Rations.**

- (1) Type and number of days.
- (2) Resupply.
- (3) Cooking.
- (4) Dog rations.
- (5) Rum.

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**b. Equipment and Dress.**

- (1) Change of clothing.
- (2) Large or small pack.
- (3) Poncho.
- (4) Footwear.
- (5) Maps, compasses and air photos.
- (6) Torches.

**c. Avoidance of Noise.**

- (1) Does equipment rattle?
- (2) Leave behind men with coughs.

**d. Weapons.**

- (1) Types and distribution.
- (2) Grenades; check fuses.
- (3) Signal cartridges.

**e. Medical.**

- (1) First field dressing J. Packs.
- (2) Medical orderly and haversacks.
- (3) Water sterilizing tablets.
- (4) Salt tablets.
- (5) Paludrine.
- (6) Foot powder.
- (7) Copper sulphate ointment for burns.
- (8) Insect repellent.

**f. Special Equipment.**

- (1) Saws and parangs.
- (2) Toggle ropes.
- (3) Cameras.
- (4) Finger print outfit.
- (5) Surrender pamphlets.

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- (6) Explosives.
- (7) Dogs.
- (8) Marker balloons.

g. Inspect all equipment for serviceable.

**5. Command and Signal:**

**a. Frequencies.**

- (1) Times of opening.
- (2) Special Instructions.
- (3) Air.

**b. Codes.**

- (1) Net Identification Signs.
- (2) Codes.
- (3) Passwords.

**c. Checks and Test Sets as follows.**

- (1) Aerials.
- (2) CW Keys.
- (3) Spare batteries.

**d. Ground/Air Communications.**

- (1) DZ Panels and DZ Letters Allotted.
- (2) Ground/Air Signal Codes.

e. Silent Signals (See Annex 2).

**Note:** Check thoroughly that all points been understood by patrol members.

## **PATROL DEBRIEFING AIDE-MEMOIRE**

### **GENERAL**

1. The purpose of this aide-memoire is to guide those who have to debrief patrol commanders.
2. It suggests a number of questions but it must not stop "debriefs" from asking any other questions they may think relevant
3. The proper channel for reporting answers to higher formation is through the daily SITREP. Only in exceptional circumstances are supplementary reports needed.

### **HINTS ON DEBRIEFING**

4. Make the person who is being debriefed comfortable.
5. Do not make him write the answer. You must do the work while he relaxes.
6. Debrief as soon as possible while the knowledge is still fresh in his mind.
7. Avoid asking questions that suggest the answer.
8. Patrol commanders will answer these questions better if they know what is needed before they go out.
9. **Adversary:**
  - a. Where contacted? (time, date, place, grid reference).
  - b. How many? of what races and sex?
  - c. Any known persons? Can you describe any of them?
  - d. How were they dressed?

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- e. Were they carrying packs?
- f. How were they armed? (Weapons seen and estimated from volume of fire).
- g. What were they doing? If moving, in which direction? Did they them?

10. **Adversary Camps:**

- a. Where and when was the camp discovered?
- b. How was it sited, e.g valley, hillside, hilltop?
- c. How many huts or building?
- d. What type were they?
- e. How long ago were they built?
- f. When were they last used? By how many?
- g. Were any defences constructed? Describe layout, including sentries posts, warning signals, booby-traps, dugouts etc.
- h. How many approach or escape routes? Give their directions.
- i. Any weapon, ammunition or armourers tools? What was their condition and quantity?
- j. Any food dumps in the camp?
- k. Any signs of printing press.
- l. Any signs of radio being used?
- m. Any documents? If so, where were they found? Has the place of finding been out on each document? Where are they now?
- n. What was done to the camp?

11. **Adversary Cultivation Area:**

- a. Location, time and date?
- b. What was in it?

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- c. What was the condition of the store?
- d. How was its concealment?
- e. When was it last visited?
- f. Estimate the age of the dump.
- g. Has the dump been added to since it was first laid down.
- h. What was done with the stores?

12. **Topography:**

- a. Was the intelligence briefing accurate? If not, what inaccuracies were discovered?
- b. Was the map accurate? If not, what were the inaccuracies?
- c. If air photos were used, was the interpretation useful?
- d. What was the state of tracks followed?
- e. Were any other tracks or game trails seen? Where?
- f. Where rivers were crossed or followed, give location of:
  - (1) Bridges (included type).
  - (2) Fords.Were they in recent use?

13. **Local Inhabitants:** If any local inhabitants were contacted outside their normal locations, state:

- a. Name of camp.
- b. Were they friendly?
- c. Whether previous Government contact or not.

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- d. Have they moved recently? If so, why?
- e. Did they give any information?

14. Any other comments

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